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INTRODUCTION 
There are ninety-four federal district courts in the United States, but 
nearly half of the six thousand patent cases filed in 2013 were filed in just 
two of those courts: the District of Delaware and the Eastern District of 
Texas.1 In the Eastern District of Texas and the District of Delaware—
 
 1 Based on statistics from September 16, 2013, 6134 patent cases were expected to be filed in 
federal district courts in 2013; of those, 1464 were expected to be filed in the District of Delaware 
and 1327 were expected to be filed in the Eastern District of Texas. See Press Release, Perkins 
Coie, Unprecedented Patent Case Concentration (Sept. 16, 2013), available at 
http://www.perkinscoie.com/news/news_detail.aspx?news=1476; see also Ryan Davis, Eastern Texas 
Judge Has Nation’s Busiest Patent Docket, LAW360 (May 13, 2014, 7:42 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/536886/eastern-texas-judge-has-nation-s-busiest-patent-docket, 
archived at http://perma.cc/999J-6LXZ (explaining the reasons underlying the high volume of 
patent litigation brought in the Eastern District of Texas). 
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neither of which is home to a major technology industry2—patent litigation 
comprises an astounding proportion of each court’s docket: twenty-eight 
percent of 2013 filings in the Eastern District of Texas were patent cases 
while fifty-six percent of 2013 filings in the District of Delaware were 
patent cases.3 In fact, the two judges with the busiest patent dockets—
Judge Rodney Gilstrap in the Eastern District of Texas and Judge Leonard 
Stark in the District of Delaware—have larger patent dockets than does the 
entire Central District of California, the district that receives the third 
most patent cases in the country.4 
While the popularity of the Eastern District of Texas and the District of 
Delaware with patent plaintiffs is a relatively recent phenomenon,5 the 
litigation tactic of selecting the court that offers the greatest odds of 
success—otherwise known as forum shopping—is not. Forum shopping has 
been a significant concern in the patent system for over forty years.6 Forum 
 
 2 See Mark A. Lemley, Where to File Your Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 401, 407 (2010) 
(explaining that unlike other top destinations for patent cases, Delaware and Texas have neither 
large populations nor prominent technology industries).  
 3 See FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS DECEMBER 2013 (2013), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/FederalCourtManagementStatistics/district-courts-december-
2013.aspx (select “Delaware” or “Eastern Texas”; then follow “Go” hyperlink) (noting that in 2013, 
2374 total cases were filed in Delaware and 5330 total cases were filed in the Eastern District of 
Texas); Statistics Summary, Lex Machina, U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware (on 
file with author) (noting that in 2013, 1335 of the filings in Delaware were patent cases); Statistics 
Summary, Lex Machina, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas (on file with 
author) (noting that in 2013, 1494 of the filings in the Eastern District of Texas were patent cases). 
In third place for percentage of patent cases was the Northern District of California, which 
devoted about 3% of its overall civil docket to patent cases in 2010. Henry Wong, An Empirical 
Look at the District Courts Handling Patent Cases 8 ( Jan. 20, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://www.socialaw.com/slbook/judgeyoung12/HBW%20Final%20Paper.pdf. 
 4 Judges Gilstrap and Stark had 941 and 532 patent cases, respectively, added to their dockets 
in 2013; in contrast, the Central District of California received 399 patent case filings that same 
year. Davis, supra note 1. The changes in joinder rules from the America Invents Act partially 
explain the incredibly high number of cases filed with Judges Gilstrap and Stark. See Christopher 
A. Cotropia et al., Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), 99 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2014) (manuscript at 2) (demonstrating that the rise in raw numbers of patent suits since 2010 was 
driven by changes to the joinder rules); see also David O. Taylor, Patent Misjoinder, 88 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 652, 700-06 (2013) (describing the legislative process behind the change in the joinder rules). 
 5 From 1995 to 1999, Delaware received 3.2% of all patent filings in the United States, while 
the Eastern District of Texas did not rank in the top ten venues for patent litigation. Kimberly A. 
Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 
889, 903 (2001). 
 6 Congress felt that patent forum shopping was so problematic that in 1982, it created the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in an effort to curb the practice. Federal Courts 
Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified in scattered sections of 28 
U.S.C.); see also Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—1981: Hearings on H.R. 2405 Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th 
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shopping is generally understood to be driven by the search for favorable 
substantive law, favorable procedural rules, or “home court advantage.”7 
However, the persistence of forum shopping in patent law cannot be fully 
explained by substantive legal differences or home court advantage.8 Patent 
litigants cannot obtain substantive legal differences by forum shopping 
because all federal district courts are bound by the same legal rules that 
come from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Furthermore, 
the fact that the majority of patent cases are filed in district courts that do 
not have sizeable technology industries indicates that most forum shopping 
is not the result of major technology companies seeking the advantages of 
litigating at the nearest courthouse.9 
That leaves procedural differences. This Article theorizes that forum 
shopping in patent law is driven, at least in part, by federal district courts 
competing for litigants. This competition occurs primarily through 
procedural and administrative differentiation among courts. All patent 
infringement cases are heard in federal court and are therefore governed by 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Despite the existence of the Federal 
Rules, district courts across the United States have adopted local rules 
specifically for patent cases. Intriguingly, some districts have adopted local 
patent rules despite almost never hearing patent cases in their courtrooms,10 
 
Cong. 6 (1981) (statement of C.J. Howard T. Markey, Court of Customs and Patent Appeals) 
(discussing the problems of forum shopping in patent law); id. at 50 (statement of J. Jancin, Jr., 
President-Elect, American Patent Law Association) (discussing forum shopping stemming from 
the lack of national uniformity in patent law); H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20-21 (1981) (explaining 
how forum shopping exists because some circuits are “pro-patent” and some are “anti-patent”); 
Comm’n on Revision of the Fed. Court Appellate Sys., Structure and Internal Procedures: 
Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 370 (1975) (arguing that forum shopping in patent law 
was “extensive”); Jack Q. Lever, Jr., The New Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Part I), 64 J. 
PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 178, 186-97 (1982) (describing congressional motivation behind the creation of 
the Federal Circuit); Ellen E. Sward & Rodney F. Page, The Federal Courts Improvement Act: A 
Practitioner’s Perspective, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 385, 387-88 (1984) (discussing congressional concern 
about patent forum shopping and the detrimental effects of uncertainty on patent values). 
 7 See infra Part I. 
 8 See Moore, supra note 5, at 938 (concluding that a “concrete explanation of forum selection 
[in patent law] is often elusive”); see also Lemley, supra note 2, at 428 (evaluating district courts 
empirically across a range of characteristics consistently identified with forum shopping and 
finding that the traditional theoretical conception of forum shopping matches with the practice 
“only in part”). 
 9 See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1463-64 (2010) (finding that 
patent cases cluster outside of traditional technology centers due to plaintiff-friendly procedures 
and no restrictions on forum shopping). 
 10 See Megan M. La Belle, The Local Rules of Patent Procedure, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. (forthcoming 
2015) (manuscript at 18), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2459785 (noting that the explanation 
for patent local rules is, in some districts, “less [than] obvious”). 
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suggesting that local patent rules serve a signaling function for courts 
looking to attract potential patent litigants. 
Beyond procedural distinctions, courts can compete for litigants by 
adopting administrative norms and practices that align with plaintiff 
preferences, such as predictable judge assignment procedures, favorable 
case management norms, and preferential motions practices. Conversely, a 
court can dissuade litigants from filing in its courtrooms by adopting norms 
that are contrary to litigant preferences, such as randomization of judge 
assignments and adoption of case management norms which do not appeal 
to particular litigants. To encourage filings, court-created norms must be 
consistent and predictable; in contrast, to discourage filings, courts must 
seek to decrease predictability. In essence, maintaining trial management 
practices in a predictable manner that favors a particular type of litigant 
(almost always plaintiffs) allows district courts to compete for the business 
of litigation, while adopting case management practices that litigants 
disfavor or that are unpredictable reduces a court’s ability to attract forum 
shoppers. 
Appreciating the impact of court competition in patent litigation 
provides numerous explanatory benefits over the current litigant-centric 
theory of forum shopping. First, court competition offers an explanation 
for the prevalence of patent forum shopping in the Federal Circuit era.11 
Although the Federal Circuit was created in an effort to eliminate the 
forum shopping caused by regional variations in patent law,12 forum 
shopping remains rampant today. Court competition theory suggests that 
by centralizing patent appeals in the Federal Circuit—and thus unifying the 
law nationally—the relative importance of distinctions between district 
court administrative practices increased significantly. The presence of a 
centralized appellate court allows district courts to better leverage case 
management distinctions in an effort to attract patent litigants. 
Second, court competition for patent cases better explains the appeal of 
particular district courts to plaintiffs. The traditional account of outcome- and 
geographic-based distinctions as the basis for forum shopping cannot 
account for district courts with similar characteristics that experience vastly 
different numbers of case filings. For instance, the Eastern District of Texas 
 
 11 See generally Lemley, supra note 2 (collecting data about the effect of different factors 
specific to district courts on patentees’ choices of where to file); Moore, supra note 5, at 901-24 
(suggesting that the venue and identity of the filing parties can affect outcomes in patent 
litigation, in turn leading to forum shopping and its adverse consequences). 
 12 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2-4 (1989) (describing Congress’s motivations for creating the Federal Circuit). 
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receives over 1300 patent cases annually,13 while the Eastern District of 
Oklahoma has received only two patent cases in the past decade.14 
Similarly, likelihood of success at trial cannot fully explain litigant choice.15 
Empirical studies find that patentees are most successful when bringing 
suit in the Northern District of Texas, yet litigants largely prefer the 
Eastern District of Texas and the District of Delaware.16 Court competition 
theory, in contrast, better maps the forum shopping that occurs in patent 
cases: courts that adopt procedures that appeal to patent litigants tend to 
receive more patent filings than courts that offer less appealing procedures. 
Lastly, court competition theory links patent forum shopping with 
other legal areas that have also experienced high rates of forum shopping, 
most particularly bankruptcy law.17 Bankruptcy judges have engaged in 
many of the same practices that district courts have used to attract litigants. 
The primary difference is that for patent cases, some courts have actively 
discouraged litigants from filing in their courts;18 similar examples of courts 
actively discouraging filings are not present in the literature on bankruptcy 
court competition. 
The fact that bankruptcy and patent law are the two fields of federal law 
that have experienced large amounts of court competition suggests that 
legal fields with specialized judges may be more prone to court 
competition. This may be true for a number of reasons. First, specialized 
courts may receive greater benefits from successfully attracting litigants 
than do courts of general jurisdiction and therefore are more likely to 
attempt to increase case filings. Scholars have suggested that specialist 
bankruptcy judges seek to attract cases in order to increase the power of the 
court.19 By increasing case filings, specialized judges justify their specialized 
position and expand the court’s influence and prestige. Second, specialist 
judges may have unique non-bureaucratic reasons to compete for cases. 
Specialists more easily obtain the prestige associated with being an expert 
 
 13 See supra note 1. 
 14 Lemley, supra note 2, at 435 app. A. 
 15 See id. at 410 (“In short, if patentees or accused infringers are to pick a forum only by win 
rate, both sides should probably be picking different districts than they currently do.”). 
 16 Id. at 407-09 tbl.3. 
 17 For a broader discussion of similar issues experienced by bankruptcy courts with respect to 
forum shopping, see LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG 
CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 25-48 (2005). 
 18 See, e.g., infra subsection II.A.2.c (discussing the Eastern District of Virginia’s attempts to 
discourage patent litigants from filing in the District’s Alexandria Division). 
 19 See generally LOPUCKI, supra note 17. 
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jurist than do generalist judges.20 Indeed, much of what motivates 
generalist judges to pursue increased patent filings is the ability to 
specialize. In many respects, some judges on the Eastern District of Texas 
and the District of Delaware operate like specialist patent judges. 
The history of court competition in patent and bankruptcy law has 
normative implications for policymakers. The prevalence of court 
competition in areas of specialized adjudication suggests that lawmakers 
contemplating new, specialized courts should carefully consider—and 
limit—future courts’ abilities to attract litigation. In particular, lawmakers 
should consider restricting venue options in specialized legal areas to 
reduce court competition. Furthermore, attention should be paid to the 
oversight capabilities of appellate courts tasked with policing the case 
management practices of trial courts in specialized legal fields. 
Forum shopping has fundamentally altered the landscape of patent 
litigation in ways detrimental to the patent system as a whole.21 Court 
competition creates even more problems, ranging from reduced trust in the 
judicial process to uneven playing fields for litigants. Congress and legal 
academics have proposed a variety of solutions to reduce forum shopping. 
Those proposals usually involve either increased venue restriction for 
patent cases or the creation of a specialized patent trial court—essentially, 
all proposals involve limiting choice for litigants. This Article sketches out 
possible modifications to patent case assignment rules that could be used—
possibly in conjunction with venue restrictions—to reduce both forum 
shopping and court competition. Three potential modifications are 
examined. First, Congress could require district courts to randomize their 
assignment procedures. Second, patent cases could be assigned randomly to 
a subset of district court judges. Currently, Congress is engaged in just such 
an experiment on a small scale: the Patent Pilot Program (PPP) allows 
qualifying districts to assign patent cases to a small group of judges within 
the district.22 Third, patent cases could be assigned by a judicial panel, 
similar to the one used for Multi-District Litigation (MDL). This Article 
also addresses jurisdictional concerns involved in employing such 
assignment methods. Ultimately, while the more radical case assignment 
procedures would reduce forum shopping and court competition for patent 
cases, they would also increase litigation costs for all patent plaintiffs—not 
 
 20 See id. at 45-47 (describing one particular bankruptcy judge’s status as a “bankruptcy 
celebrity”); see also infra subsection II.B.1. 
 21 See Fromer, supra note 9, at 1464-65 (discussing the negative results of widespread forum 
shopping). 
 22 See infra subsection III.C.2. 
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just forum shopping plaintiffs. Thus, this Article supports a more modest 
fix: a randomization requirement for federal district court judge 
assignment. 
This Article’s argument proceeds in three parts. Part I offers an 
overview of the literature on forum shopping. That literature largely 
understands forum shopping as revolving around the search for favorable 
substantive and procedural law, while largely ignoring any active role for 
courts and judges in the process. 
After establishing the theoretical foundations of forum shopping, Part 
II provides a historical account of forum shopping in patent law, beginning 
with the pre–Federal Circuit era before turning to current practices. 
Profiles of three district courts—the District of Delaware, the Eastern 
District of Texas, and the Eastern District of Virginia—serve as a case 
study. As a partial explanation for the existence of forum shopping in 
patent cases, this Part introduces the theory of court competition. Building 
on the case study, this Part examines the trial practices that courts can use 
to influence venue decisions. Additionally, this Part offers possible 
explanations for courts’ interest in competing for patent cases, such as 
increased judicial prestige, personal satisfaction, and indirect budgetary 
benefits. 
Part III explores the normative implications of court competition by 
specialized courts. In doing so, it connects the Article’s description of court 
competition for patent cases with the literature of court competition in 
bankruptcy law. Bankruptcy scholars have proposed increased 
randomization as a means of reducing court competition. Building on those 
proposals, this Part examines three potential avenues for randomizing 
patent case assignment. 
 
I. FORUM SHOPPING 
Forum shopping has long been considered “a national legal pastime.”23 
While the fairness of forum shopping has been hotly debated among jurists 
and academics,24 litigants regard the choice of venue as just one tool among 
 
 23 J. Skelly Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE L. 
REV. 317, 333 (1967). 
 24 Compare Goad v. Celotex Corp., 831 F.2d 508, 512 n.12 (4th Cir. 1987) (“There is nothing 
inherently evil about forum-shopping.”), and Atl. Star, [1974] A.C. 436 (H.L.) 471 (appeal taken 
from Eng.) (Simon of Glaisdale, L.J., dissenting) (stating that forum shopping “should be a 
matter neither for surprise nor for indignation”), with Fromer, supra note 9, at 1464-65 (explaining 
the “three principal concerns” of forum shopping in patent law). 
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many in the litigation toolkit.25 Venue choice can, among other things, lead 
to larger verdicts,26 favorable substantive law,27 more permissive statute-of-
limitation periods,28 or sympathetic juries.29 Litigants may face a host of 
different venue options: between state and federal court, between various 
state courts, or between different federal courts. Forum shopping can 
involve international venue considerations as well.30 
Existing legal scholarship on forum shopping has almost universally 
focused on the actions of plaintiffs and defendants.31 In the traditional 
account, forum shopping involves three steps: (1) determining which 
forum(s) meet the prerequisites for subject matter jurisdiction, personal 
 
 25 The ability to file a case in one of a number of different courts has been an important part 
of litigation since the Supreme Court’s 1878 decision in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878). Since 
Pennoyer, the Supreme Court has attempted to clamp down on the more egregious abuses of “tag” 
jurisdiction. However, many of these decisions have increased parties’ ability to forum shop. For 
example, International Shoe Co. v. Washington—the preeminent case on personal jurisdiction—
established more sensible jurisdictional principles than Pennoyer, but it also expanded state (and 
by extension federal) court jurisdiction to defendants with “minimum contacts” with the forum. 
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). The minimum contacts standard means that national corporations are 
more likely to be subject to jurisdiction in a variety of fora, increasing the ability of clever 
plaintiffs to shop for the most advantageous venue. 
 26 See Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L. REV. 553, 
556 (1989) (“Especially in tort cases, venue often determines the size of a verdict because the 
generosity of juries varies from one location to another.”). 
 27 See id. at 558 (noting that forum shopping in divorce cases results from a desire to “evade 
overly restrictive home-state divorce laws”); see also Harold G. Maier & Thomas R. McCoy, A 
Unifying Theory for Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 249, 266-67 (1991) 
(arguing that plaintiffs forum shop to obtain more favorable law). 
 28 See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 772 n.1 (1984) (involving a libel suit 
brought in New Hampshire where relatively few magazines were sold after Ohio dismissed the 
suit on statute-of-limitations grounds); see also Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 729-30 
(1988) (allowing States to apply their own statutes of limitations to claims governed by the 
substantive law of a different state). 
 29 In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)—a famous example of 
venue decisions being driven by jury pool—the plaintiffs filed suit in Creek County, Oklahoma, a 
blue-collar area known for large tort awards. See Juenger, supra note 26, at 560. The defendants 
then removed the case to federal court to secure the more “straight-laced” jurors in Tulsa, but 
ultimately the Supreme Court held that Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction, so the venue game was for 
naught. Id.  
 30 See id. at 560-62 (discussing a case involving an overseas plane crash litigated in federal 
court in Los Angeles). Many of the same considerations that drive forum shopping in state and 
federal courts influence the choice of international forum as well. Indeed, foreign jurisdictions 
seem more welcoming of alien forum shopping than the U.S. Supreme Court. See id. at 564 
(“Compared to the United States Supreme Court, some foreign tribunals positively welcome 
forum shoppers.”). 
 31 See, e.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REV. 333, 379 (2006) (“The 
players in forum shopping include the plaintiff(s) and counsel, the defendant(s) and counsel, and 
any anticipated additional participants.”).  
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jurisdiction, and venue; (2) weighing the benefits and drawbacks of each 
eligible forum; and (3) filing suit in the forum that yields the greatest 
likelihood of a favorable outcome.32 Scholars have identified three main 
factors that determine how litigants evaluate the likelihood of favorable 
outcome:33 favorable substantive law,34 favorable procedural provisions,35 
and favorable local considerations.36 For instance, in some cases a plaintiff 
might prefer a particular venue because courts in that jurisdiction are 
bound by a legal rule that favors the plaintiff ’s case, while other forums do 
not follow that particular rule. In other cases, different procedural rules 
(such as differing statutes of limitation) could motivate a plaintiff to file in 
one forum but not another. Lastly, local considerations (such as proximity 
to witnesses and the composition of the prospective jury pool) may 
influence a plaintiff to prefer one forum over another. 
Defendants are not completely powerless when faced with a forum-
shopping plaintiff. Defendants can urge the court to transfer the case to a 
forum that is less favorable to the plaintiff. In modern practice, courts 
typically transfer cases in one of two ways. First, the common law doctrine 
of forum non conveniens permits courts to transfer cases over which they 
have jurisdiction but which would pose an inequitable inconvenience to the 
 
 32 See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-Shopping, 
80 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1508 (1995) (“The plaintiff ’s opening moves include shopping for the 
most favorable forum. Then, the defendant’s parries and thrusts might include some forum-
shopping in return, possibly by a motion for change of venue.”); see also Bassett, supra note 31, at 
382 (applying rational choice theory to forum shopping and concluding that “the rational lawyer 
will choose” the venue that potentially offers “a more favorable outcome”).  
 33 See Bassett, supra note 31, at 346, 348-50 (listing the “considerations that inform and 
guide” forum decisions as choices involving (1) different substantive laws, (2) different procedural 
provisions, and (3) subjective and personal factors). 
 34 See Nita Ghei & Francesco Parisi, Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Forum Shopping: 
Conflicts Law as Spontaneous Order, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1367, 1390 (2004) (identifying 
substantive law differences as an important consideration in forum shopping); Antony L. Ryan, 
Principles of Forum Selection, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 167, 191 (2000) (“One of the most important 
potential consequences of forum selection is a difference in applicable law.”). 
 35 Ryan, supra note 34, at 200 (“The choice of favorable substantive law is the most dramatic 
prize for the successful forum-shopper, but there are also many important procedural distinctions 
among courts.”). 
 36 Local considerations consist of a variety of factors that are unique to each court. These 
factors can include judicial reputation; geographical proximity to litigants, witnesses, or counsel; 
reputation of a court’s jury pool; and counsel’s familiarity with the court. See Mary Garvey 
Algero, In Defense of Forum Shopping: A Realistic Look at Selecting a Venue, 78 NEB. L. REV. 79, 80 
n.2 (1999) (cataloguing the potential motives for forum shopping); Bassett, supra note 31, at 350-51 
(listing the factors involved in choosing venue); Juenger, supra note 26, at 573-74 (noting 
considerations of “the forum’s reputation for fairness (or pro-plaintiff bias), the efficacy and speed 
of judicial proceedings, the quality of available counsel, and . . . the ‘legal climate’”). 
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courts or parties.37 This doctrine is most often invoked in cases involving 
foreign defendants.38 Alternatively, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) permits courts to 
transfer a civil action to another district “[f]or the convenience of parties 
and witnesses, in the interest of justice.”39 Second, defendants have the 
option of filing a motion to dismiss for improper venue.40 Kevin Clermont 
and Theodore Eisenberg summarize the venue game as follows: “The 
plaintiff ’s opening moves include shopping for the most favorable forum. 
Then, the defendant’s parries and thrusts might include some forum-
shopping in return, possibly by a motion for change of venue. Venue is 
worth fighting over because outcome often turns on forum.”41 Clermont 
and Eisenberg’s empirical work validates their claim regarding the 
importance of venue. They found that plaintiffs win 58% of civil cases that 
remain in the plaintiff ’s selected forum.42 On the other hand, in cases that 
are transferred to the defendant’s preferred venue, the plaintiff wins only 
29% of the time.43 The frequency and intensity with which parties litigate 
venue only serves to reinforce the point. 
Nearly everything written about forum shopping—whether from a 
judicial, academic, or practitioner perspective—involves some iteration of 
the familiar moves described above. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
courts have been overlooked as players in the forum shopping game because 
many of the factors thought to influence forum shopping (e.g., substantive 
law, procedural rules, and local considerations) are outside the control of 
any particular judge or court. For instance, the doctrine of stare decisis 
prevents a trial judge from altering the law by which he or she is bound to 
attract litigants.44 Similarly, a judge is powerless to place his or her court in 
proximity to witnesses or to alter the characteristics of the local jury pool. 
 
 37 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947) (proposing a balancing test for 
courts to use when deciding whether to dismiss a claim under the doctrine); Edward L. Barrett, 
Jr., The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 380, 389-90 (1947) (examining the 
constitutional limitations on the application of the doctrine in the United States). 
 38 See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430 (2007). 
 39 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012). 
 40 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(3). 
 41 Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 1508. 
 42 Id. at 1511-12. 
 43 Id. at 1512. 
 44 See Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. 
REV. 723, 725-29 (1988) (examining theories of stare decisis and the broader context of their 
evolution). 
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Traditional scholarship has also assumed that courts are disinterested in 
impacting venue decisions.45 If a court increases its appeal to litigants, the 
workload of that court increases with no corresponding increase in 
compensation. The work of a judge is stressful enough without 
unnecessarily seeking out more work. Thus, courts are portrayed in the 
literature as “passive” institutions lacking both the incentive and the ability 
to influence litigants’ venue preferences.46 
 
II.  COURT COMPETITION 
Unlike many forum shopping plaintiffs, patent litigants cannot, in 
general, shop for favorable substantive law. Patent cases in all U.S. district 
courts are governed by the law of the Federal Circuit, not the circuit where 
the district resides.47 Furthermore, patent litigants are bound by the same 
set of procedural rules—the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.48 
 
 45 See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody 
Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 11 (1993) (characterizing some judges as pursuers of 
“leisure”). 
 46 See WOLF HEYDEBRAND & CARROLL SERON, RATIONALIZING JUSTICE: THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 26 (1990) (“Courts are relatively passive 
organizations within a demanding environment . . . .”); see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE 
LEGAL SYSTEM: A SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 191 (1975) (“Courts in our tradition are 
passive; they sit waiting for cases. They do not call them up on their own . . . .”). See generally 
Donald J. Black, The Mobilization of Law, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 125 (1973) (arguing that litigants 
shape the law’s application and interpretation by initiating and defending cases). 
 47 Patent cases are governed by the substantive law of the Federal Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1295(a)(1) (2012) (granting the Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over cases arising under 
federal patent law). In limited circumstances (such as cases with patent law raised solely as a 
counterclaim), cases with patent issues fall outside the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit. See, e.g., 
Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 834 (2002) (“Not all cases 
involving a patent-law claim fall within the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction.”). But even those cases 
tend to be decided by looking to the law of the Federal Circuit. See Christopher A. Cotropia, 
“Arising Under” Jurisdiction and Uniformity in Patent Law, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 
253, 309-10 (2003) (arguing that regional circuits should look to Federal Circuit law for patent 
issues even where the Federal Circuit does not have jurisdiction).  
 48 While intracircuit procedural nuances still exist, the Federal Circuit has held that 
procedural rules on “patent-related” matters are governed by Federal Circuit law, while procedural 
rules pertaining to nonpatent issues are governed by circuit law. Panduit Corp. v. All States 
Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574-75 & n.14 (Fed. Cir. 1984). For a critique of this rule, see 
Ted L. Field, Improving the Federal Circuit’s Approach to Choice of Law for Procedural Matters in 
Patent Cases, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 643, 685 (2009), where the author argues that the Federal 
Circuit “has inconsistently articulated its choice-of-law rules for procedural issues in patent cases” 
and applied them inconsistently. In addition to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, many 
district courts have adopted their own procedural rules for patent cases, an issue I address in 
depth in subsection II.B.2.a. 
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There are, to be sure, a number of formal procedural differences 
between district courts. Almost all federal district courts have adopted 
additional “local” rules that supplement the Federal Rules. An increasing 
number of courts have even adopted special “patent local rules” that only 
apply in patent cases.49 But as further discussed in subsection II.B.2.a, infra, 
these differences between local rules are more likely to serve as signals of 
court competition for patent cases than as driving forces behind litigants’ 
choice of forum. Scholars of the patent system have identified a host of 
court factors that entice litigants to file patent cases in particular courts.50 
These characteristics include time to trial, likelihood of getting to trial, and 
average damage awards. 
Despite legal scholars’ inattention to the role of courts in forum 
shopping,51 courts have engaged in competition for litigants in various legal 
areas. Properly understood, forum shopping in patent law is partly the 
result of this competition for litigants. 
The theory of court competition complicates the traditional notion of 
forum shopping.52 Instead of a single-step game played between the 
plaintiff and defendant, court competition theory involves a two-step 
model. First courts compete (if they choose to do so); then plaintiffs and 
defendants engage in forum shopping. 
In the first stage—court competition—courts establish procedural rules, 
administrative procedures, and informal norms of case management in their 
courtrooms.53 If those established procedures are predictable and favorable 
to the party selecting the forum, they may attract litigants to file in that 
particular forum. To the extent they are unpredictable or unfavorable to the 
party selecting the forum, they may dissuade litigants from filing there. Of 
 
 49 See generally La Belle, supra note 10 (manuscript at 15-21) (explaining the “special” rules of 
procedure that the Federal Circuit and lower Federal Courts have developed for patent cases). 
 50 See supra note 8 and accompanying text; see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of 
Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 805 (2008) 
(analyzing suggestions to decrease forum shopping for a host of different factors by improving 
appellate decisionmaking in patent cases and using specialized courts). 
 51 A few scholars have broken with the traditional narrative of courts as neutral players in the 
venue game. For example, Friedrich Juenger has written about courts influencing venue decisions 
in international law, although he has not focused attention on courts competing with other courts 
within the same country. See Juenger, supra note 26, at 564-70 (describing how many foreign 
countries openly flaunt their litigation-friendly rules to attract “alien” plaintiffs). Similarly, Lynn 
LoPucki has detailed the manner in which bankruptcy courts and judges have engaged in 
competition for litigants. See generally LOPUCKI, supra note 17. 
 52 See generally LOPUCKI, supra note 17, at 137 (distinguishing “court competition” from 
“forum shopping”). 
 53 See infra subsection II.B.2. 
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course, most trial management procedures are not designed to influence 
litigants’ choice of forum. Judges are, in most cases, largely indifferent to 
the types of cases filed in their courts and simply handle the cases assigned 
to them in the most efficient manner possible. However, in certain 
instances, a court might desire to have some influence over the nature of its 
docket. It is in those instances that court competition becomes relevant. 
Even if a forum maintains administrative norms that appeal to 
plaintiffs, the court must find some method of communicating those norms. 
Courts can signal their interest in certain types of cases in various ways. 
First, the court can codify certain practices into local procedural rules. 
Second, word-of-mouth can convey the court’s interest to other litigants. 
Practitioner publications are filled with suggestions of courts that are ideal 
for certain types of cases. Lastly, judges and courts can explicitly announce 
their interest in certain types of cases. While this last signaling method 
may seem unlikely, it is increasingly common in modern patent litigation 
practice.54 
Forum shopping plaintiffs or defendants then battle over forum in an 
attempt to secure the court with the most favorable set of legal rules, 
procedural rules, and administrative norms. First, the plaintiff selects the 
most favorable forum in which the jurisdictional requirements are met. In 
response, the defendant has three options: (a) acquiesce to the plaintiff ’s 
choice of venue, (b) move to transfer the case to another venue that is more 
favorable to the defendant, or (c) bring a motion for forum non conveniens. 
In some cases, the defendant can preempt the venue choice of the plaintiff 
by filing a declaratory judgment action.55 
To be clear, the model described above does not reject the previous 
literature on forum shopping or the features of courts that scholars have 
previously identified as important to forum-shopping litigants. Instead, the 
model builds upon previous scholarship by examining where and why those 
court-specific features develop in the first place. The thesis of this Article 
assumes that courts are, at times, motivated by concerns outside the 
traditional realms of equity and efficiency typically associated with the 
judicial role. Courts can seek to attract litigants by offering services that 
appeal to particular plaintiffs. Conversely, these same institutions can seek 
to repel litigants by offering unappealing services. Courts can compete with 
each other for litigants, and at times, they do. 
 
 54 See infra Section II.B. 
 55 See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007) (finding jurisdiction 
over a declaratory judgment action challenging the validity of a patent even though the patent 
licensee had not breached its license). 
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There are generally three concerns associated with forum shopping in 
general and patent forum shopping in particular: non-uniformity, 
inefficiency, and unfairness.56 Forum shopping creates uneven enforcement 
when patent rights are more likely to be upheld in particular courts.57 The 
practice is also inefficient because litigants often spend resources litigating 
over venue. Furthermore, uneven enforcement of rights makes the legal 
system appear unjust and arbitrary.58 
Court competition heightens the three concerns generally associated 
with forum shopping. First, to compete for litigants, courts must 
distinguish themselves from other courts by offering more services that 
appeal to one party—the party selecting venue. By offering what amounts 
to plaintiff-friendly services, the odds of success are tilted in favor of 
patentees in those venues. Second, court competition adds additional 
inefficiencies to the judicial process. Aside from the typical venue battles 
that litigants wage, courts seeking to influence venue choices make case 
management decisions in an effort to attract future litigants, rather than to 
handle cases efficiently. This can lead to inefficient procedural and 
administrative practices. Lastly, when courts actively pursue litigants, 
questions of judicial neutrality are inevitable. 
To examine court competition theory in patent law, Section A of this 
Part describes the history of forum shopping in patent law beginning with 
the period immediately before the creation of the Federal Circuit and up to 
the present day. In doing so, it studies the history of three high-volume 
patent districts: the District of Delaware, the Eastern District of Virginia, 
and the Eastern District of Texas. Section B suggests possible motivations 
for judges and courts to engage in court competition. Then, based on the 
case study of the three district courts, it discusses ways in which courts 
compete for litigants. 
 
 
 56 See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 9, at 1464-65 (describing the underlying flaws of forum 
shopping). 
 57 Id.; see also Moore, supra note 5, at 920-21, 921 fig.4 (discussing the effects of forum 
shopping on the outcome of the case).  
 58 Moore, supra note 5, at 924 (“This instability erodes public confidence in the law and its 
enforcement and creates doubt about the fairness of the system.”). 
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A. The Rise of Court Competition in Patent Litigation 
1. Shopping for a Circuit Court: 1970–1982 
Before 1970, patent litigation was a highly specialized practice.59 Nearly 
all patent litigation was handled by boutique law firms filled with former 
employees of the United States Patent & Trademark Office (PTO).60 The 
typical path to becoming a patent litigator consisted of working for a short 
time at the PTO, then transitioning to a private company or law firm to 
learn the nuances of patent procurement, and then advancing to the 
specialized litigant class of the patent bar.61 Perhaps because of this 
customary apprenticeship in patent prosecution (the term used for 
procuring patents), patent litigators of the era were uncomfortable with 
jury trials. Thus, the overwhelming majority of patent cases before 1970 
were tried without juries.62 
During the 1970s, however, seasoned litigators began entering the field 
of patent litigation. The trial lawyers who ventured into the arcane world of 
patent law began emphasizing the value of juries.63 Additionally, these 
attorneys brought a wealth of knowledge from other legal fields, which they 
quickly applied to patent cases. They introduced complex procedural 
arguments into patent cases, many of which were adopted by courts.64 The 
new emphasis on procedural and legal innovations, as well as the increased 
 
 59 See Lawrence Baum, Judicial Specialization, Litigant Influence, and Substantive Policy: The 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 11 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 823, 835 (1977) (finding that the patent 
bar in 1977 was a “group of four thousand lawyers constitut[ing] a particularly distinct 
specialization within the legal profession”); cf. Ralph E. Harper, Commentaria, An Open Letter to 
the Patent Bar, 56 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 189, 190 (1974) (referring to a subset of the Patent Bar 
members as the “litigating bar”). 
 60 See Wilbur F. Pell, Jr., Patent Law Cases – A Retrospective View from a Lame Swan Appellate 
Judge, 9 APLA Q.J. 105, 107 (1981) (describing the author’s experience as a lawyer at a general 
practice firm whose patent practice consisted of giving inventors directions to the offices of nearby 
patent firms). 
 61 See Craig E. Larson & Donald S. Holland, A Study of New Patent Lawyers, 9 APLA Q.J. 12, 
33 (1981) (“At the beginning of their practice, the majority of all new lawyers spend virtually all of 
their time on patent procurement.”); Robert D. Yeager, The Patent Profession: A Time to Go Public 
For New Lawyers, 9 APLA Q.J. 60, 63-64 (1981) (describing professional paths and career 
progressions for patent attorneys). 
 62 See J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, Empirical, and 
Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 18-21 (2014) (discussing the 
rise of jury trials beginning in the mid-1970s). 
 63 See id. at 19-20 (explaining litigators’ many reasons for favoring juries and the success of 
this strategy). 
 64 The Sixth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 
84 F.R.D. 429, 440-43 (1979) (lamenting the burdensome nature of patent litigation in district 
courts, especially abuses of the discovery process). 
  
2015]   Court Competition for Patent Cases 647 
 
importance of juries, led to an explosion of forum shopping in patent 
cases.65 
When patent lawyers went in search of the ideal forum in the 1970s, 
they were shopping for circuits that were “pro-patent.”66 Regional 
variations in substantive patent law determined whether a circuit court was 
characterized as pro- or anti-patent.67 Some circuits imposed high standards 
of proof to uphold the validity of a patent, while others did not.68 Some 
circuits made it difficult for declaratory judgment plaintiffs to establish 
standing, while others did not.69 And some circuits were simply skeptical of 
the value of the patent system generally, while others found it beneficial.70 
Patent holders tended to prefer to file their cases in a district court 
within the Fifth, Sixth, or Seventh Circuit because various holdings from 
those circuits improved a patentee’s odds of success.71 Defendants 
commonly filed motions to transfer.72 Defendants usually preferred to 
litigate in the Eighth or Ninth Circuit, where case law was less favorable 
towards patentees.73 Motions to dismiss were litigated with vigor.74 
Empirical evidence validates these anecdotes: the odds of having a patent 
 
 65 See generally Scott E. Atkinson et al., The Economics of a Centralized Judiciary: Uniformity, 
Forum Shopping, and the Federal Circuit, 52 J.L. & ECON. 411 (2009) (empirically demonstrating 
that forum shopping on the basis of patent validity rates was widespread but ceased in the late 
1970s). 
 66 See id. at 415 (noting various courts of appeals that were known to rule in favor of 
patentees more often than other courts). 
 67 See Howard T. Markey, The Phoenix Court, 10 APLA Q.J. 227, 232-34 (1982) (explaining the 
numerous differences among courts in the tests, standards, and practices employed in patent 
cases). 
 68 See id. at 233 (describing the differing obviousness standards for design patents among the 
various circuit courts). 
 69 See id. at 232 (describing the divergent practices among circuit courts regarding whether 
the licensee had to terminate the license to challenge the validity of a patent in a declaratory 
judgment action).  
 70 See Dreyfuss, supra note 12, at 6-7 (explaining the overall skepticism toward the patent 
system and the differing burdens various courts placed on patentees and alleged infringers). 
 71 Id. at 7; Robert L. Harmon, Seven New Rules of Thumb: How the Federal Circuit Has 
Changed the Way Patent Lawyers Advise Clients, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 573, 573-74 (1992). 
 72 Consider Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 342-44 (1960), in which an accused infringer was 
ultimately denied transfer from the Fifth Circuit to the Seventh Circuit but not before litigating 
the transfer motion in both circuits and the Supreme Court. 
 73 Harmon, supra note 71, at 574 (“When this author broke into the business, and for many 
years thereafter, it was quite clear that there was no such thing as a valid patent in the Eighth 
Circuit, and the climate in the Ninth Circuit was not much more hospitable.”). 
 74 See supra note 72. 
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found to be valid could differ by over fifty percent, depending on the circuit 
court that ultimately reviewed the case.75 
Many patent lawyers were troubled by the substantial differences 
between circuits in the handling of patent cases. In 1972, Congress 
established the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate 
System (better known as the “Hruska Commission”) to explore ways to 
control the increasing number of cases filed in the federal courts.76 Patent 
reform advocates saw the Hruska Commission as an ideal opportunity to 
push for a solution to the divergent approaches to patent validity among 
the various circuits.77 The Hruska Commission was inundated with 
complaints about forum shopping generally and the problem with patent 
forum shopping in particular. Professor James Gambrell and well-known 
patent attorney Donald Dunner testified before the Commission about 
their survey of patent attorneys. Gambrell and Dunner’s findings confirm 
the common perception of patent attorneys of this era: forum shopping was 
“extensive” and “directly attributable” to the differences in application and 
interpretation of the patent statute among the various numbered circuit 
courts.78 According to Gambrell and Dunner, “patent owners and alleged 
infringers spend inordinate amounts of time, effort and money jockeying 
for a post position in the right court for the right issues. Nowhere is the 
quest more vigorously pursued than for the right forum to rule on 
validity.”79 
In response, the Hruska Commission recommended that a national 
appeals court be established to address some, but not all, patent cases.80 
Under the Commission’s proposal, typical patent cases would have 
 
 75 See Atkinson et al., supra note 65, at 433 (“[A]ll else constant, a switch from the Third 
Circuit to the Tenth Circuit in the pre-[Federal Circuit] era results in an increased likelihood of 
patent validity of 0.52.”). 
 76 See generally Comm’n on Revision of the Fed. Court Appellate Sys., Structure and Internal 
Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 218-19 (1975) (“The question, however, is 
whether, in light of the other demands placed upon the [Supreme] Court, and considering the 
interests of the system as a whole, some issues might better be decided by another tribunal 
empowered to hand down precedents of national effect.”). 
 77 F. M. Scherer, The Political Economy of Patent Policy Reform in the United States, 7 J. ON 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 167, 188 (2009) (describing how the majority of respondents 
approved a “proposal calling for a new centralized appellate court . . . [that] was circulated in July 
1978 to [anyone] likely to have any significant interest in the subject” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); see also Dreyfuss, supra note 50, at 788 (“It was thought that if patent appeals were 
channeled to a single court, . . . the quality of decisions in patent disputes would improve.”). 
 78 Comm’n on Revision of the Fed. Court Appellate Sys., Structure and Internal Procedure: 
Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 369-70 (1975). 
 79 Id. at 370. 
 80 Id. at 371. 
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continued to be litigated in the numbered circuit courts of appeal. But, if a 
particularly difficult question of patent law arose, the case could be 
transferred to the newly established court.81 The Commission rejected 
proposals to create an appeals court that would handle all patent matters.82 
Two years after the Hruska Commission’s recommendations, Congress 
passed the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 (FCIA).83 Breaking 
with the Hruska Commission’s recommended solution, the FCIA created 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and gave the 
court exclusive jurisdiction over all appeals arising under the patent laws.84 
Congress’s motivation to create the Federal Circuit stemmed in large part 
from a desire to eliminate regional differences in patent enforcement that 
were driving forum shopping in patent litigation. By centralizing patent 
appeals in one circuit, Congress hoped to harmonize patent law across the 
United States and eliminate forum shopping in patent litigation.85 
 
2. Shopping for a District Court: 1982–2013 
By and large, the creation of the Federal Circuit has succeeded in 
creating a uniform, national patent law.86 Although the court has been 
criticized for being “pro-patent” and overly formalistic (among other 
things), centralizing all appeals in one court has eliminated regional 
variations in substantive law.87 Because all patent appeals now are heard at 
the Federal Circuit, patent holders, at least in theory, can no longer forum 
shop for advantageous substantive law. 
Despite the Federal Circuit’s oversight and control of patent law, forum 
shopping persists.88 Over six-thousand patent cases are filed annually in the 
United States,89 but those cases are not evenly distributed among the 
 
 81 Id. 
 82 See generally Scherer, supra note 77, at 187-88 (discussing the Commission’s rejection of a 
specialized court to hear all patent appeals). 
 83 See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified in 
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).  
 84 Id. 
 85 See Dreyfuss, supra note 12, at 2-3 (discussing the efficiency and administrative reasons 
weighing in favor of the creation of the Federal Circuit). 
 86 Id. at 74 (“On the whole, the CAFC experiment has worked well for patent law, which is 
now more uniform, easier to apply, and more responsive to national interests.”). 
 87 See generally id. at 64-65 (discussing the success of the Federal Circuit and proposing ways 
to increase its efficiency). 
 88 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 5, at 901-07 (conducting an empirical analysis of patent forum 
shopping). 
 89 Projections indicate a total of 6134 patent cases will be filed in the United States in the 
year 2013. Press Release, Perkins Coie, supra note 1. 
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ninety-four U.S. federal district courts. Nearly half of all cases are filed in 
the top two districts (Delaware and Eastern Texas) and seventy-five percent 
are adjudicated in the top ten districts.90 Geographical considerations do 
not explain the concentration of patent cases.91 
Scholars have empirically examined the problem in an attempt to 
decipher precisely what drives forum shopping in patent law. Then-
professor Kimberly Moore—who is now a Federal Circuit judge—
conducted the first empirical analysis of forum shopping in patent cases 
filed after the creation of the Federal Circuit.92 Moore found that the 
cluster of patent cases filed in certain districts could not be explained fully 
by the concentration of innovation in those districts.93 Moore also found 
that the party that initially files suit (i.e., a patentee in an infringement 
action or an accused infringer in a declaratory judgment action) was a 
significant predictor of validity, enforceability, and infringement.94 “The 
most likely explanation” for this result, Moore concludes, “is that forum 
and timing really do matter.”95 
Moore hypothesized that a number of differences among district courts 
could explain the forum shopping phenomenon. She found that the top 
districts tended to be those with speedier dockets, greater likelihood of 
settlement before trial, or higher patentee win rates.96 However, Moore 
admitted that none of these traditional characteristics could explain the 
stratification of patent cases.97 As a solution to the forum shopping 
problem, Moore proposed either the creation of a specialized patent district 
court98 or modification of the patent venue statute.99 
 
 90 See id. (summarizing 2013 patent case concentration). 
 91 See Fromer, supra note 9, at 1453-54 (positing that courts’ generous interpretation of the 
venue statutes makes geography irrelevant in patent cases). Xuan-Thao Nguyen argues that the 
Eastern District’s high concentration of patent cases is consistent with the large numbers of 
patentees who reside in Texas. Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Justice Scalia’s “Renegade Jurisdiction”: Lessons 
for Patent Law Reform, 83 TUL. L. REV. 111, 134-35 (2008). But the fact that Texas has a large 
number of patentees does not explain why so many patentees file suit in the Eastern District of 
Texas rather than in the Northern, Southern, or Western Districts, all of which have larger 
populations, more technologically-based companies, and, presumably, more patentees. 
 92 Moore, supra note 5, at 892. 
 93 Id. at 904-07. 
 94 Id. at 921. 
 95 Id. at 921-22. 
 96 Id. at 907-18. 
 97 Id. at 919 (“Th[e] variation suggests that there may be no single explanation of patent 
holders’ selection of particular jurisdictions.”). 
 98 Id. at 932-34. 
 99 Id. at 934-37. 
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Mark Lemley has found that patent forum shopping has increased since 
Moore’s study.100 Lemley’s study assumes patent litigants are seeking the 
traditional benefits of forum shopping: the best mixture of speed, 
likelihood of getting to trial, and win-rate.101 However, like Moore, Lemley 
admits that those characteristics cannot explain the clustering that occurs in 
patent litigation. For example, according to Lemley’s theory, patent filings 
should not be clustered in the Eastern District of Texas.102 Instead, 
Lemley’s metrics indicate that the Middle District of Florida, a rather 
unpopular forum with patent litigants, should be receiving more patent 
cases than Texas.103 
To shed light on why certain districts receive the bulk of patent cases, 
this Section will examine the forum shopping experience of three district 
courts: the Eastern District of Texas, the District of Delaware, and the 
Eastern District of Virginia. 
 
a. Eastern District of Texas 
Over the past decade, the district that has received the most attention—
some might say notoriety—for its patent litigation docket has been the 
Eastern District of Texas. A mere afterthought for patent plaintiffs in 2000, 
the Eastern District had eclipsed all other districts for patent filings by 
2008.104 Today, over twenty-one percent of all patent cases are filed there.105 
The rise of the Eastern District of Texas as the premier patent forum is a 
complex and controversial story. Regardless of what one thinks of the 
merits of the district as a patent forum, however, it is nearly universally 
accepted that the district’s preeminent place in patent litigation today is 
largely due to the efforts of one man: Judge T. John Ward.106 
 
 100 See generally Lemley, supra note 2 (discussing the most advantageous forums in which to 
file patent suits).  
 101 Id. at 402-03. 
 102 Id. at 410 (pointing out that the Eastern District of Texas is not even among the top five 
districts in terms of patent win-rates).  
 103 Id. at 421 (“The best aggregate patent district for plaintiffs is, surprisingly, the Middle 
District of Florida.”). 
 104 Elizabeth P. Offen-Brown, Note, Forum Shopping and Venue Transfer in Patent Cases: 
Marshall’s Response to TS Tech and Genentech, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 61, 70 & tbl.1 (2010) 
(depicting the Eastern District of Texas’s “drastic increase in patent filings”). 
 105 See Press Release, Perkins Coie, supra note 1. 
 106 See, e.g., Yan Leychkis, Of Fire Ants and Claim Construction: An Empirical Study of the 
Meteoric Rise of the Eastern District of Texas as a Preeminent Forum for Patent Litigation, 9 YALE J. L. 
& TECH. 193, 207 (2007) (discussing Judge Ward’s influence on the district); Michael C. Smith, 
Rocket Docket: Marshall Court Leads Nation in Hearing Patent Cases, 69 TEX. BAR J. 1045, 1048 
(2006) (listing Judge Ward’s efforts to welcome patent cases in his district). But see Nguyen, supra 
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Prior to Ward’s arrival on the bench, the Eastern District heard few 
patent cases. The district had long been known as a plaintiff-friendly 
district, often attracting class action personal injury suits.107 Plaintiff firms 
were attracted to the district due to the unique attributes of the local jury 
pool.108 Judge Ward was appointed to the bench in the Eastern District in 
1999. Almost immediately he set out to attract patent litigants to his 
district.109 
Two years after Ward was appointed to the court, he adopted a set of 
additional procedural rules for patent cases modeled on the Northern 
District of California’s rules.110 Ward’s rules had a few plaintiff-friendly 
elements that the Northern District of California’s rules lacked.111 For 
example, while the Northern District established an eighteen-month 
discovery period, Ward’s rules permitted only nine months.112 Furthermore, 
Ward’s rules provided defendants little ability to alter the discovery 
deadlines or trial dates, allowing plaintiffs to impose a strict timeline on 
often overwhelmed defendants.113 The entire Eastern District adopted 
Ward’s rules in 2005.114 
 
note 91, at 123 (stating that Richard Agnich, the former general counsel for Texas Instruments, is 
“generally credited for the creation of the EDTX as the patent trial court”).  
 107 See Ronen Avraham & John M. Golden, From PI to IP: Yet Another Unexpected Effect of 
Tort Reform 15-18 (Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, Law and Econ., Research Paper No. 211, 2012), 
available at http://web.stanford.edu/dept/law/ipsc/Paper%20PDF/Golden,%20John%20-%20Paper.pdf 
(finding that tort reform led to an increase in patent filings in Texas possibly due to greater 
“space” in courts’ dockets to hear IP cases). 
 108 See Dick Dahl, IP Plaintiffs Flocking to Small Town in Eastern Texas, ST. LOUIS DAILY 
REC., June 6, 2006 (describing the benefits accruing to plaintiffs from the “uneducated” local jury 
pool that favors property rights); see also Nguyen, supra note 91, at 122-24 (describing how other 
companies followed the lead of Texas Instruments in deciding to bring large patent suits in the 
Eastern District of Texas to take advantage of the court’s “speediness”). 
 109 See Allen Pusey, Marshall Law: Patent Lawyers Flock to East Texas Court for Its Expertise and 
‘Rocket Docket,’ DALL. MORNING NEWS, Mar. 26, 2006, at 1D (describing how the city of 
Marshall, Texas began to attract more patent litigation).  
 110 James Ware & Brian Davy, The History, Content, Application and Influence of the Northern 
District of California’s Patent Local Rules, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 965, 
1011 (2009). 
 111 See Alfonso Garcia Chan, Proposed Patent Local Rules for Adoption by Texas’ Federal District 
Courts, 7 COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH. J. 149, 151 (2003) (comparing Judge Ward’s local rules 
with the Northern District of California’s rules); Alisha Kay Taylor, What Does Forum Shopping in 
the Eastern District of Texas Mean for Patent Reform?, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. OF INTELL. PROP. L. 
570, 572-73 (2007) (describing the unique Eastern District of Texas local rules, including the 
mandate requiring defendants to compile all information used to invalidate the plaintiff ’s claims 
before trial). 
 112 Leychkis, supra note 106, at 209. 
 113 Id.  
 114 See E.D. TEX. PAT. R. 1-3. 
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The new rules brought predictability and uniformity to the district’s 
case management practices. In addition, the Eastern District’s rules resulted 
in litigants getting to trial twice as quickly as litigants in the Northern 
District of California.115 The speed and predictability of litigation in the 
Eastern District led to an explosion in patent filings. The district’s caseload 
grew from fourteen patent filings in 1999 to fifty-five in 2003.116 
Patent plaintiffs found the district to be accommodating in many other 
ways as well. For instance, the district gained a reputation for awarding 
massive patent infringement damages. In 2006, for example, Z4 
Technologies received a $133 million damages award against Microsoft 
Corporation.117 Even more appealing to plaintiffs, no plaintiff had ever lost 
a patent trial in the Eastern District until 2005: twelve trials had resulted in 
twelve verdicts of valid and infringed.118 The speed, large damage awards, 
outstanding win-rates, likelihood of getting to trial, and plaintiff-friendly 
local rules suddenly made the Eastern District the venue of choice for 
patent plaintiffs. Filings jumped to 214 in 2006.119 
The Eastern District also began experimenting with its case assignment 
system for patent cases. Patent-holding companies (known as patent trolls 
or non-practicing entities) began to view the Eastern District as an ideal 
venue for their repeat appearances.120 The cities and towns in the Eastern 
District profited from the increase in patent litigation. Money from out-of-
town litigation has supported the economies of Marshall and other cities in 
the Eastern District.121 Indeed, Marshall has long enjoyed the economic 
benefits of litigation. Prior to the rise of patent cases, the city enjoyed a 
reputation as a haven for personal injury suits.122 The legal community, in 
particular, has also benefited from the increased workload. Some local firms 
switched from acting as local counsel in personal injury suits to providing 
 
 115 See Dahl, supra note 108 (quoting a plaintiffs’ attorney stating that his case would have 
taken twice as long in California). 
 116 Leychkis, supra note 106, at 206 tbl.6. 
 117 Z4 Techs. v. Microsoft, No. 06-0142, 2006 WL 1626711, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2006). 
 118 See Leychkis, supra note 106, at 211-12 tbl.7 (listing the damages awarded in those cases). 
 119 Id. at 205 tbl.5. 
 120 See Julie Creswell, So Small a Town, So Many Patent Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2006, at 
B1 (“A lot of the cases being filed in Marshall are by patent holding companies, or patent 
trolls . . . .”). 
 121 See Dahl, supra note 108 (noting the increase in commercial rental values and the support 
of local hotels and restaurants to accommodate patent attorneys). 
 122 See Creswell, supra note 120 (discussing class action suits filed by Marshall lawyers against 
companies that used asbestos). 
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counsel to patent firms.123 The economic benefits of the patent docket have 
also enabled the Eastern District to renovate its court buildings.124 
In fact, the economic windfall of increased patent litigation in the small 
towns of East Texas has been felt in some of the most unlikely corners. 
Companies that frequently litigate in the town of Marshall, Texas—
including Tivo, Medtronic, and Opti Inc.—have helped stimulate the local 
economy by purchasing prize cattle at the livestock auction during Farm 
City Week in Marshall.125 Tivo purchased its steer for around $10,000, 
shortly before a major trial in Marshall began.126 Festivals all over Marshall 
have benefited from the deep pockets of companies coming to the town’s 
courthouses. Samsung, the electronics giant, is the sponsor of most major 
festivals in Marshall.127 
 
b. District of Delaware 
Perhaps the largest outlier district in terms of number of patent 
litigation filings relative to the number of patent-holders in the state is the 
District of Delaware. The District of Delaware has been one of the busiest 
patent districts in the country for over fifteen years yet has little local 
industry to speak of, few patentees within the state, and a small civil 
docket.128 Despite the lack of connection to technology industries, 
Delaware is the state of incorporation for the majority of America’s largest 
corporations.129 Delaware’s status has given its courts a disproportionate 
 
 123 See Dahl, supra note 108 (stating that the Roth law firm switched from 75% personal 
injury work to 75% intellectual property work over the course of five years); see also Avraham & 
Golden, supra note 107, at 17-19 (demonstrating that tort reform led to a rise in patent cases in the 
Eastern District of Texas). 
 124 Nguyen, supra note 91, at 142 n.153 (“[T]he century-old Harrison County Courthouse in 
the Marshall division has been renovated and updated to handle the expanding patent docket.”). 
 125 See, e.g., Zusha Elinson, IP Trial Strategy: Buying Tivo’s Bull, RECORDER ( June 26, 2009), 
http://www.therecorder.com/id=1202431746710, archived at http://perma.cc/5NMX-GGZT 
(demonstrating an example of an attorney’s case strategy involving the purchase of a steer at a 
local livestock auction).  
 126 Id. (explaining that the seller, a high school senior, received $10,000 from the sale for her 
college fund). 
 127 Id. 
 128 See Moore, supra note 5, at 903-05 & tbls.1 & 2 (demonstrating the relatively small patent 
caseloads and number of patents granted in Delaware as compared to a sampling of other U.S. 
states). 
 129 About Agency, STATE OF DEL., http://www.corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml (last 
visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/79GB-ATYL (“More than 50% of all publicly-
traded companies in the United States including 64% of the Fortune 500 have chosen Delaware as 
their legal home.”). 
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number of opportunities to establish expertise in multiple areas of business 
law, including corporate law, bankruptcy, and, more recently, patents.130 
Because of Delaware’s unique ties to the business community, its courts 
have been particularly interested in attracting litigation to the state.131 
Delaware’s economy is largely based on its status as a business 
headquarters, and the courts are largely viewed as part of that economy.132 
The local bar is intimately connected with the judiciary. Attracting 
litigation to the state means income from visiting attorneys. It also 
increases the business for local attorneys, who are required to participate in 
all proceedings before the Delaware courts.133 Furthermore, increased 
workloads often lead to increased budgets for the judiciary.134 
Attracting patent litigation to Delaware has not been difficult. The 
judges in Delaware receive the most patent cases per capita of any district 
in the country.135 Thus, the District of Delaware offers unparalleled 
expertise in patent cases. 
Beyond expertise, the District also offers a number of other benefits for 
patent litigants who are interested in getting to trial—usually plaintiffs. 
Delaware is the district in which a patent case is most likely to reach trial—
almost 12% of cases receive a trial.136 The district achieves this high trial 
rate not through local patent rules, but rather through a norm shared by the 
district’s judges to grant summary judgment motions rarely.137 The 
infrequency of obtaining summary judgment increases costs for defendants, 
 
 130 See LOPUCKI, supra note 17, at 47-48. 
 131 See LOPUCKI, supra note 17 and accompanying text (stating that court competition is 
more likely in specialized legal fields than nonspecialized fields). 
 132 Delaware has also competed for securities class action cases. See John Armour, Bernard 
Black & Brian Cheffins, Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 605, 647 
(2012) (describing Delaware’s attempt and failure to attract more securities class action cases). But 
see Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 942, 963 (Del. Ch. 2013) 
(upholding a forum selection clause in a Delaware corporation’s bylaws requiring plaintiffs to file 
in Delaware). 
 133 D. DEL. R. 83.5(d); BANKR. D. DEL. R. 9010-1(c). 
 134 See infra subsection II.B.1.b (indicating that increased caseloads can lead to additional 
judgeships which then lock in higher budgetary outlays). 
 135 See Donald F. Parsons, Jr. et al., Solving the Mystery of Patentees’ “Collective Enthusiasm” for 
Delaware, 7 DEL. L. REV. 145, 150 tbl.2 (2004) (illustrating the high rate at which patent cases are 
filed per judge in Delaware relative to other states). 
 136 Lemley, supra note 2, at 411 tbl.4. 
 137 See id. at 403 (arguing that jurisdictions that deny summary judgment motions are more 
patent-friendly). 
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increases the odds of getting to trial, and incentivizes defendants to settle 
out of fear of potentially large damage awards.138 
Maintaining informal norms regarding summary judgment and trial 
practices can be difficult for a court. Individual judges may have 
preferences that differ from the court as a whole. But with only four judges, 
Delaware’s small size permits the district to settle on shared norms more 
easily than would be possible in a larger district. 
 
c. Eastern District of Virginia 
The Eastern District of Virginia possesses a number of attributes that 
are appealing to plaintiffs. Most noticeably, since 1997 the district has had 
the fastest average case time for its civil docket of any district court in the 
country.139 Patent cases reach resolution, on average, in less than eight 
months and those that go to trial usually do so in less than a year.140 But 
speed is not the only advantage for patent plaintiffs in the so-called “rocket 
docket”:141 the district has many experienced patent jurists, is home to the 
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, chooses from a jury pool with a large 
number of scientifically trained individuals, and awards relatively high 
damages on average when a patent is found to be infringed.142 
The Eastern District of Virginia’s reputation as a forum for speedy 
justice began long before patent litigation was a major component of 
federal civil dockets. In the 1950s, Judge Bryan of the Eastern District 
decided that he would speed up the trial process in his courtroom. The 
desire for speedy execution of justice would eventually pervade the entire 
 
 138 See Timothy B. Lee, Courts in Two States Are Tilting the Nation’s Patent System Toward 
Plaintiffs, WASH. POST (Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/ 
2013/09/19/courts-in-two-states-are-tilting-the-nations-patent-system-toward-plaintiffs, archived at 
http://perma.cc/U3EN-SEYV (“[J]udges in Delaware are relatively slow to rule on summary 
judgment motions. That raises the cost of litigation for defendants, giving plaintiffs more leverage 
in settlement negotiations.”). 
 139 Jerry Markon, A Double Dose of Molasses in the Rocket Docket, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2004, 
at C4. 
 140 Lemley, supra note 2, at 414 tbl.5, 416 tbl.6 (indicating the average time to resolution and 
time to trial for selected U.S. district courts including averages for the Eastern District of 
Virginia of 0.64 and 0.96 years, respectively). 
 141 See, e.g., Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Reconceiving the Patent Rocket Docket: An Empirical Study of 
Infringement Litigation 1985–2010, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 58, 61-63 (2011) 
(suggesting that the district’s strict enforcement of early deadlines and “effective, judge-driven 
settlement program” earned the Eastern District of Virginia its “rocket-docket” reputation). 
 142 Id. at 60-64, 69. 
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culture of the court.143 To this day, the court prides itself on being one of 
the fastest courts in the country. The court achieves its current speed by 
imposing a heavy-handed case management style early in the trial process 
and strictly enforcing a tight trial schedule.144 
Patent litigants did not fully appreciate the benefits of litigating in the 
Eastern District of Virginia until the late 1990s.145 Once patent litigators 
fully appreciated the advantage of the “rocket docket,” however, the district 
experienced an explosion of patent filings, receiving over sixty per 
month.146 But the increased number of patent filings was not entirely 
welcomed by the judges of the district. Because patent cases are complex 
and technical, the district found that it was unable to maintain its quick 
pace while wading through hundreds of patent cases.147 
In response, the district made two subtle changes to its administrative 
practices that were designed to dissuade patent litigants from using their 
courts.148 First, the judges on the court began to transfer cases out of the 
district at a much higher rate.149 In the mid-1990s, it was considered rare for 
the Eastern District of Virginia to transfer cases out of its district,150 but the 
 
 143 See T.S. Ellis, III, Quicker and Less Expensive Enforcement of Patents: United States 
Courts, Presentation at the Proceedings of the 1999 Summit Conference on Intellectual Property 
(1999), in 5 CASRIP PUBLICATION SERIES: STREAMLINING INT’L INTELL. PROP. 11, 14 (2000) 
(“[The rocket docket] has been in effect since the 1950s, largely as the result of the efforts of Judge 
Albert Bryan . . . .”); see also Heather Russell Koenig, The Eastern District of Virginia: A Working 
Solution for Civil Justice Reform, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 799, 802 (1998) (“The local rules for the 
entire Eastern District of Virginia were structured to eliminate docket delay and expedite the 
sometimes burdensome litigation process . . . .”). 
 144 See Vishnubhakat, supra note 141, at 61-63; see also Dabney J. Carr, IV & Robert A. Angle, 
Litigating Patent Infringement Cases in the “Rocket Docket” of the Eastern District of Virginia, 22 
INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 14, 14 (2010) (noting that the Eastern District of Virginia’s local 
rules outline a short timeline for each stage of trial). 
 145 See Dana D. McDaniel, Patent Litigation on the Rocket Docket After Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc., VA. LAW., Apr. 2002, at 20, 20 (describing the explosion of patent filings in the 
late 1990s). 
 146 See infra note 156 and accompanying text (noting the Eastern District of Virginia’s high 
monthly rate of patent filings). 
 147 See Lloyd Smith, An Interview with Judge Gerald Bruce Lee, United States District Court, 
Eastern District of Virginia, LANDSLIDE, Nov.–Dec. 2013, at 7, 9 (finding patent cases 
“[a]bsolutely” more complex and time-consuming). 
 148 See William P. DiSalvatore, Filing Considerations in Patent Litigation, in PATENT 
LITIGATION 81, 92-95 (2001) (discussing the Eastern District of Virginia’s efforts to reduce its 
attractiveness as a forum for patent litigation by various means, including increased venue 
transfer). 
 149 See id. (noting that the courts have been less willing to defer to the plaintiff ’s choice of 
forum). 
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Eastern District soon began transferring a large number of patent cases to 
other venues.151 Judge Lee of the Eastern District has stated that “if we did 
not properly examine the venue, then we would be overwhelmed with every 
single patent case that involved a device that was sold at Tyson’s Corner 
Mall,” a popular mall in a suburb of Washington, D.C..152 
The second change that the Eastern District made to dissuade patent 
filers was an alteration of the judge assignment procedure for patent cases. 
The Eastern District of Virginia has three divisions: Alexandria, Norfolk, 
and Richmond.153 Before 2002, civil litigants were randomly assigned to a 
judge within the district in which the case was filed.154 Most patent 
plaintiffs preferred to file in the Alexandria division due to its proximity to 
the PTO and Washington D.C. law firms, its predictable trial management 
of patent cases, and its experience in handling patent cases.155 But in 2002, 
the Alexandria division was receiving up to sixty patent case filings per 
month, a number that made it impossible for the court to maintain its 
speedy reputation.156 
To reduce the flood of patent litigants, the Eastern District changed its 
case assignment procedures.157 The new assignment procedure stipulated 
that patent cases (and only patent cases) that were filed in the Alexandria 
 
05d316ad34f4, archived at http://perma.cc/C5Q5-H7GT (noting that even when another venue is 
available, “rarely is a defendant able to successfully avoid the whirlwind ride on the Rocket 
Docket”). 
 151 See Moore, supra note 5, at 915 (highlighting the Eastern District of Virginia’s increased 
willingness to transfer patent cases). 
 152 Smith, supra note 147, at 9. 
 153 Carr & Angle, supra note 144, at 14. 
 154 See Dabney J. Carr, IV & Robert A. Angle, Traps for the Unwary: Litigating Intellectual 
Property Cases in the Rocket Docket, 11 MEALEY’S LITIGATION REPORT: INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY, Apr. 7, 2003, at 1, 7 n.3 (“Previously, the Alexandria division did not assign cases to 
particular judges until trial. For hearings or proceedings prior to trial, parties were assigned 
randomly to any of the judges in the division.”). 
 155 See id. at 1-2 (discussing some of the advantages of filing in Alexandria). The Alexandria 
division has a reserved day for nondispositive motions hearings, whereas the Norfolk and 
Richmond divisions do not. Id. at 5. In the Alexandria division, unlike in the Richmond division, 
discovery and nondispositive motions are heard by magistrates. Id. And in the Alexandria and 
Richmond divisions, unlike in the Norfolk division, at least one judge is always available to rule 
on emergency motions. Id. at 4. 
 156 Timothy S. Ellis, III, Remarks at the Seventh National Advanced Forum on Litigation 
Patent Disputes (Feb. 5, 2001), cited in McDaniel, supra note 145, at 23 n.1.  
 157 Carr & Angle, supra note 144, at 18 n.1 (describing the assignment procedure which 
randomly assigns cases among the speedy Alexandria docket as well as Norfolk and Richmond); 
see also Smith, supra note 147, at 9 (“One of the reasons we decided as a court to randomly assign 
patent cases is because we realized we were being overwhelmed here in Alexandria . . . . We 
decided to spread the cases around and it has helped us greatly.”). 
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division were to be randomly reassigned among the judges of all three 
divisions.158 Under the new rules, a litigant expecting to try his patent case 
before the experienced judges in Alexandria might find himself litigating 
before a less-experienced patent jurist in Norfolk or Richmond. 
The changes achieved the Eastern District’s goals of reducing patent 
filings.159 As a result, the “rocket docket,” with its unpredictable judge-
assignment procedure and its willingness to transfer patent cases to other 
district courts, has not attracted patent cases at nearly the same rate as the 
District of Delaware or the Eastern District of Texas.160 
 
B. Court Competition in Patent Litigation 
Some district judges have become increasingly open about their desire 
to see more patent cases come to their courtrooms. Prior to his nomination 
to the bench, Judge Ward of the Eastern District of Texas had almost no 
patent experience to speak of—he litigated a single patent case while in 
private practice.161 But upon becoming a judge, Ward decided that he would 
seek out patent litigants. Judge Ward stated, “I enjoyed the intellectual 
challenge [of the patent case], so when I came to the bench, I sought out 
patent cases.”162 
More recently, judges in other districts have echoed Judge Ward’s desire 
to increase patent litigation filings in their districts. For instance, Judge 
Conti of the Western District of Pennsylvania has noted that her district 
“ha[s] been trying to be a good forum for patent cases.”163 Judge Lancaster, 
also in the Western District of Pennsylvania, has expressed hope that the 
Patent Pilot Program “will continue to attract more out-of-state [patent] 
cases to the area.”164 
 
 158 See Carr & Angle, supra note 154, at 2. 
 159 See Smith, supra note 147, at 9 (indicating that the random assignment system has served 
its purpose in reducing Alexandria’s patent docket). 
 160 See Roderick R. McKelvie, Forum Selection in Patent Litigation: A Traffic Report, 19 INTELL. 
PROP. & TECH. L.J. 1, 1 (2007) (summarizing patent case filings to show that the Eastern District 
of Virginia “continues to lag behind other districts in attracting patent cases”). 
 161 Pusey, supra note 109. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Katie Angliss, Patent Law in Pittsburgh: Perspectives from the Bench, 11 PITTSBURGH J. 
TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 3 (2011). 
 164 Molly Hensley-Clancy, U.S. District Court of Western Pennsylvania Attracts Patent Cases, 
PITTSBURGH POST GAZETTE ( July 23, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/business/ 
legal/2012/07/23/U-S-District-Court-of-Western-Pennsylvania-attracts-patent-cases, archived at 
http://perma.cc/JM3G-2CAL. 
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Other district courts in Texas are attempting to emulate the Eastern 
District’s success in steering patent litigants to its courtrooms. In a recent 
interview, Judge Barbara Lynn of the Northern District of Texas was 
“frankly a little bit disappointed” that patent filings in her district had 
increased only “slightly” since participating in the Patent Pilot Program.165 
“I hope we’ll get more patent cases than we have right now,” she said.166 
Further, Judge Lynn hoped that her district could “be considered a real 
alternative to the Eastern District [of Texas]” because her district had “the 
interest and the capacity” to handle additional patent cases.167 Another 
judge in the Northern District has publically invited members of the patent 
bar to file cases in the district.168 The Southern District of Texas has also 
enacted reforms aimed at improving efficiency and attracting litigants.169 
Roderick McKelvie, a former judge from the District of Delaware has 
commented on the competition for patent cases. According to him, some 
district courts have “hung out a welcome sign for patent cases by expressing 
interest in the cases, forming advisory committees, or adopting local 
rules.”170 
But not all judges who are interested in influencing venue decisions are 
attempting to attract litigants—indeed some are interested in dissuading 
patent litigants from filing in their courts. The Western District of 
Wisconsin has purposefully developed a reputation for speedy 
adjudications.171 But, much like the experience of the Eastern District of 
Virginia, Western Wisconsin has found that patent cases make it difficult to 
achieve the district’s efficiency goals. According to Magistrate Judge 
 
 165 Judge Barbara Lynn on Patent Pilot Program, TEX. LAW. (2013), http://www.texaslawyer.com/ 
id=1202598369142. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Dynamic Federalism and Patent Law Reform, 85 IND. L.J. 449, 477 & 
n.196 (2010) (noting that some judges have “a strong interest in presiding over patent cases” 
(citing Jordan T. Fowles & Tung T. Nguyen, Texas Litigators Go to Lake Tahoe, INTELL. PROP. L. 
SEC. (State Bar of Tex., Austin, Tex.), 2007, at 2, available at http://www.texasbariplaw.org/ 
Portals/0/Newsletters/2007/2007%20Advanced%20Patent%20Lit%20Course.pdf )). 
 169 See whitself, Texas Smart, AGORACOM (Dec. 19, 2006), http://agoracom.com/ir/ 
patriot/forums/discussion/topics/134915-rules-of-the-court-and-frivolity/messages/519031, archived 
at http://perma.cc/6JER-N5CQ (discussing the possibility of efficiency improvements in the 
Southern District of Texas). 
 170 McKelvie, supra note 160, at 3. 
 171 See Allen A. Arntsen & Jeffrey A. Simmons, The Tundra Docket: Western District of 
Wisconsin, LAW360 (Mar. 12, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/49923/the-tundra-
docket-western-district-of-wisconsin, archived at http://perma.cc/62FN-Z2ZG (“The Wisconsin 
court’s ‘rocket docket’ status is nothing new. For the past ten years, the court has consistently 
ranked between the first and fourth-fastest courts in the country in time to trial.”). 
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Crocker of the Western District of Wisconsin, “We’ve become a patent 
magnet for the world. We never invited them. They just came.”172 
 
1. Judicial Incentive to Compete 
What would motivate a judge or a group of judges on a court to engage 
in the forum shopping game with litigants? In the case of courts seeking to 
dissuade litigants from filing in their courtrooms, the answer seems 
obvious: most federal judges have a large and ever-growing caseload—they 
do not want to see additional difficult cases arrive on their docket. 
Furthermore, patent cases are both complex and time-consuming. By 
reducing patent filings, judges can decrease their workload and focus on 
trimming their case backlog. 
But why would a judge (or a court) want to attract litigants? Shouldn’t 
they want to do precisely the opposite? Because of their fixed salaries, 
judges do not profit directly from increased filings in their courtrooms.173 
In fact, by attracting more cases, a judge increases her already large 
workload with no accompanying pay increase.174 Some explanation of the 
incentives for courts to seek out litigants is therefore in order. 
 
a. Individual Incentives 
Courts consist of individuals who possess distinct desires and interests, 
and the motivations of individual judges often fail to align with the 
motivations of their fellow judges.175 Thus, any discussion of courts and the 
incentives of courts must necessarily examine the incentives of individual 
judges within those courts. While judges receive no direct monetary 
benefits for adjudicating particular types or numbers of cases, they may 
benefit in less tangible ways. 
Personal Interest: Perhaps the most obvious reason that judges might seek 
to attract certain cases is a personal preference for hearing those cases. 
Judge Ward himself has cited “the intellectual challenge” of patent cases as 
 
 172 Jerry Crimmins, Patent Plaintiffs Flock to ‘Rocket Docket’ in Wis., CHI. DAILY L. BULL., 
Aug. 14, 2008, available at http://www.whdlaw.com/Resources/File/Carter.ChicLawBull.8.08.pdf. 
 173 See Richard A. Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations of Public 
Choice Theory, 1990 BYU L. REV. 827, 833-34 (providing context regarding the structure and 
operaton of judicial compensation and incentives). 
 174 See Posner, supra note 45, at 11 (discussing the way in which many judges are motivated to 
maximize “leisure”). 
 175 Cf. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 254 (1992) (“Individuals have intentions and purpose and motives; 
collections of individuals do not. To pretend otherwise is fanciful.”). 
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the reason he has encouraged patent litigants to file in his courtroom.176 A 
judge may have a personal preference for patent cases over other types of 
cases that appear on the court’s docket.177 While the appeal of patent cases 
is far from universal among judges,178 ninety-four district judges from the 
fourteen districts have volunteered to participate in the Patent Pilot 
Program,179 indicating that there are a number of judges who enjoy the 
work of adjudicating such cases. 
Reputational Effects: Richard Posner has suggested that federal judges 
(like him) are motivated by the same “instrumental and consumption goals” 
that motivate private individuals.180 For Posner, judges are simply self-
interested, rational actors like everyone else.181 However, as he admits, 
there are key differences between judges and private individuals, namely, 
private individuals are motivated by increased earning potential while 
federal judges have a fixed income for life.182 Posner recognizes that 
“prestige is unquestionably an element of the judicial utility function.”183 
However, he dismisses prestige as a major factor in judicial decisionmaking 
 
 176 See Pusey, supra note 109; Barrie McKenna, Venue Shopping? See You in Marshall, GLOBE & 
MAIL (May 4, 2006, 9:54 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/technology/venue-shopping-
see-you-in-marshall/article1099055, archived at http://perma.cc/3TV7-JA85 (reporting an interview 
with Judge Ward about his docket). 
 177 See Tim McGlone, Resigning Judge Says He Was Tired of Drug and Gun Cases, 
PILOTONLINE.COM (Feb. 14, 2008), http://hamptonroads.com/2008/02/resigning-judge-says-he-
was-tired-drug-and-gun-cases, archived at http://perma.cc/Z75K-ET6S (reporting that U.S. 
District Judge Walter D. Kelley, Jr., enjoyed complex patent cases more than drug and gun cases). 
 178 See Dionne Searcey, Judges Outsource Workloads as Cases Get More Complex, WALL ST. J. 
(Sept. 29, 2013, 5:40 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303983904579095 
593058503678, archived at http://perma.cc/6PFM-2PB4 (quoting Royal Furgeson, a now retired 
district court judge for the Northern District of Texas, who acknowledged that to him, as an 
English major, it had been helpful to appoint special masters in patent cases “to kind of unravel 
some of that stuff”). 
 179 Ron Vogel, The Patent Pilot Program: Reassignment Rates and the Effect of Local Patent Rules, 
N.Y. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N BULL. (N.Y. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n, Fort Lee, N.J.), Oct.–
Nov. 2013, at 5-6 app. C (listing judges participating in the program). 
 180 Posner, supra note 45, at 39. 
 181 See id. at 23-30 (comparing the decisionmaking process of judicial voting to making 
decisions in other areas of life); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 
505-06 (3d ed. 1986) (arguing that the utility function of judges is similar to that of other people 
though judges may also “seek to impose their personal preferences and values on society”). See 
generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group 
Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975) (examining the motivations of judges).  
 182 See Posner, supra note 45, at 13 (theorizing that judges are not motivated solely by money 
because of their tenure and fixed salaries). 
 183 Id. 
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because “there is little an individual judge can do to enhance his prestige as 
a judge.”184 
For district court judges, however, one available means of enhancing 
one’s judicial reputation is by becoming an expert in handling particularly 
difficult types of cases. Creating a reputation as a competent patent judge 
can, in fact, enhance one’s judicial prestige. Patent cases are widely 
recognized as extraordinarily complex and difficult cases.185 Because of the 
difficulty of trying patent cases and the large damage sums potentially at 
stake, patent cases also tend to be tried by highly competent and well-
compensated counsel. Gaining a reputation for efficient and fair handling 
of patent cases can elevate the stature of a judge among both the bar and 
his peers on the bench. 
Indeed, certain district court judges have developed such a reputation 
for competence in patent cases. These judges have distinguished themselves 
as preeminent triers of patent cases, despite that they—like all federal 
district judges—are generalists.186 If, as Posner suggests, prestige makes up 
part of the judicial utility function, then the ability to establish oneself as 
an expert adjudicator of complex cases—such as patent cases—would be an 
incentive for judges to attract more patent cases to their courtrooms. 
The prestige associated with being an expert patent trial judge brings 
other potential benefits as well. Specialized bar groups, as well as patent bar 
associations like the American Intellectual Property Association, often 
invite judges to speak at their conferences.187 Judges from the Eastern 
District of Texas, the District of Delaware, and the Northern District of 
California therefore receive a large number of invitations to such 
 
 184 Id. at 13-14. 
 185 See Smith, supra note 147, at 9 (discussing the amount of time that judges must devote to 
patent cases as opposed to other civil matters). 
 186 See, e.g., Edward Reines, Northern District of California’s New Patent Rules, PATENTLY-O 
(Feb. 3, 2008), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2008/02/northern-distri.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
66CG-NYQ6 (referring to Judge Whyte as “a leading jurist in the patent field”); Hal Wegner, 
Next Tuesday! Chief Judge Holderman (N.D. Ill.), Leading Patent Jurist, Speaks at GW April 16th; 
Sidney Katz Remembered, L.A. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N (Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.laipla.net/next-
tuesday-chief-judge-holderman-n-d-ill-leading-patent-jurist-speaks-at-gw-april-16th-sidney-katz-
remembered, archived at http://perma.cc/USY5-4FG2 (referring to Judge Holderman as “one of 
the more influential members of the Federal Judiciary in the patent area”). Judge Jordan, now a 
judge on the Third Circuit, continues to sit by designation in the district court in patent cases. See 
Hon. Kent A. Jordan, THE SEDONA CONF., https://thesedonaconference.org/bio/jordan-kent (last 
visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/T3WZ-59QC.  
 187 See, e.g., THE SEDONA CONF., https://thesedonaconference.org (last visited Jan. 16, 
2015), archived at https://perma.cc/6VZG-G59B (stating that the conference’s mission is to invite 
bright legal minds to speak about intellectual property rights). 
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conferences.188 To the extent that professional reputation is a desirable 
commodity, increasing patent filings in an effort to be perceived as an 
expert may appeal to judges. 
Indeed, the prestige associated with being a well-known patent trial 
judge can lead to post-judicial opportunities. Recently, a number of judges 
from patent-heavy districts have retired from the judiciary and entered 
private practice as patent litigators.189 In fact, the last two chief judges of 
the Eastern District of Texas have left the bench for private practice.190 In 
many cases, former judges who leave the bench to practice patent law had 
little to no experience with patent law prior to serving as a judge.191 
 
b. Institutional Incentives 
Local Benefits. Another reason that courts might seek to increase filings 
in a particular legal field is to benefit the local communities in which they 
reside. Local bar associations are often closely tied with the judges that sit 
in their localities.192 Those associations have an interest in increasing the 
legal work within their communities. Because judges often come from those 
same bar groups and retain friendships and relationships within those 
groups, they may feel a sense of pride bringing in business for local 
 
 188 Id. 
 189 Judge Ward retired from the Eastern District of Texas in 2011 and is now a partner of his 
own firm. See T. John Ward, WARD & SMITH L. FIRM, http://www.wsfirm.com/attorneys/t-john-
ward (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/GRW5-BX7T. Judge Folsom retired 
from the Eastern District of Texas in 2012 and is now a partner at Jackson Walker LLP, 
specializing in intellectual property cases. See David Folsom, JACKSON WALKER LLP, 
http://www.jw.com/David_Folsom (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/PJ2C-
F6UB. 
 190 See T. John Ward, supra note 189; David Folsom, supra note 189. 
 191 For example, Judge Farnan of the District of Delaware, a former U.S. Attorney, retired 
from the bench in 2010 and started a law firm with his sons; he lists his specialty as “patent 
litigation and consulting.” See Joseph J. Farnan, Jr., FARNAN LLP, http://www.farnanlaw.com/Joe-
Farnan-Bio.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/YJY2-PH9A. 
 192 For instance, in the Western District of Pennsylvania, the district’s selection for the 
Patent Pilot Program was seen by both judges and the local patent bar as an opportunity to 
increase the ability to compete for “out of state” patent cases. See supra notes 163-64 and 
accompanying text (describing the courts’ role in encouraging patent cases to be brought in their 
jurisdiction). 
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attorneys.193 Many district courts, including Delaware and Eastern Texas, 
have rules that require local counsel in all cases before the court.194 
Patent attorneys are particularly interested in connecting with local 
federal judges since all patent cases are tried in federal court. Thus, local 
patent bars are often well-connected with their local judges. Indeed, many 
judges have commented on the potential benefit of bringing patent cases to 
their local communities.195 
The spillover effects of increased litigation can also extend beyond the 
legal field. A number of cities within the boundaries of the Eastern District 
of Texas have seen a substantial increase in demand for office space and 
hotel rooms due to the visiting attorneys who come to town for trial.196 
Bureaucracy Theory. Scholars have long recognized that governmental 
institutions often seek to maximize the institutions’ budget.197 Bureaucracy 
theorists posit that agency officials care about “salary, perquisites of the 
office, public reputation, power, patronage, output of the bureau, ease of 
making changes, and ease of managing the bureau,” all of which depend to 
some degree on the size of the agency’s budget.198 The employees of the 
agency, so the theory goes, share an interest in budget maximization 
because the benefits of having a larger budget redound to them in the form 
of greater career prospects.199 
The budget of each district court is controlled by the Administrative 
Office of the Courts. For a court seeking to maximize its budget, increased 
workloads are one way of getting a larger slice of the judicial budgetary pie. 
Additionally, districts with larger caseloads may receive funds for 
improvements and upgrades to physical facilities, courtroom technology, 
 
 193 See Hensley-Clancy, supra note 164 (discussing judges’ enthusiasm for the Patent Pilot 
Program, in part based on the benefits to the local legal community). 
 194 For instance, both the District of Delaware and the Eastern District of Virginia require 
local counsel in all civil cases. See D. DEL. R. 83.5(d); BANKR. D. DEL. R. 9010-1(c); E.D. VA. 
LOC. ADM. R. 83.1(D)(1)(b). 
 195 See Hensley-Clancy, supra note 164 (predicting that the increase in patent cases will bring 
more work for local patent attorneys and that larger firms may also establish local offices). 
 196 See Dahl, supra note 108 (“[T]he steady pace of out-of-town-lawyers—who often arrive in 
large numbers for a high-stakes trial—has created a regular flow of money into [Marshall, 
Texas].”). 
 197 See generally WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT (1971) (applying economics to the study of bureaus and governments). 
 198 Id. at 38.  
 199 William A. Niskanen, A Reflection on Bureaucracy and Representative Government, in 
THE BUDGET-MAXIMIZING BUREAUCRAT: APPRAISALS AND EVIDENCE 13, 18-19 (André Blais 
& Stéphane Dion eds., 1991); see also Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public 
Enforcement, 127 HARV. L. REV. 853, 870-71 (2014) (stating that even lower-level employees share 
an interest in budget maximization due to trickle down effects). 
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and administrative personnel. For example, the courtrooms in the Eastern 
District of Texas were recently renovated, in part to accommodate the 
district’s high caseload.200 
Perhaps the largest bureaucratic benefit of increased caseloads is the 
potential for an additional judgeship for the district.201 Increasing the 
number of judges in a district locks in higher budgetary outlays as judicial 
salaries are constitutionally protected and district budgets are largely tied 
to the number of judges in the district.202 Additionally, each judge is 
automatically allowed to hire an assistant and one or two law clerks. 
District courts that have higher civil case loads also tend to have a greater 
number of personnel, including magistrate judges who assist judges in the 
adjudication process.203 
 
2. Judicial Ability to Compete 
If we assume that judges may, in some instances, be motivated to 
compete for litigants, what tools can those judges use to attract litigants? A 
wide variety of characteristics influence forum shopping, but many are 
outside of a court’s control. For instance, the makeup of a court’s potential 
jury pool is highly important to litigants, yet it is also a characteristic that 
courts cannot change or improve. The quality of a district’s jury pool is a 
function of the job opportunities and educational offerings found within a 
district’s boundaries.204 Courts have no direct impact on demographic 
factors. 
More fundamentally, courts are unable to offer explicitly what the 
forum shopper is ultimately seeking, namely, a successful suit. Simply 
offering victory to the highest bidder is antithetical to the judicial process. 
 
 200 Nguyen, supra note 91, at 142 n.153. 
 201 See, e.g., Letter from the Honorable B. Lynn Winmill, Chief Dist. Judge, Dist. of Idaho, 
to Senator Mike Crapo et al. 1 (Aug. 15, 2013), available at http://www.judgingtheenvironment.org/ 
library/letters/New-judgeships-ID-J-Winmill-Myers-8-15-13.pdf (“[T]he formula for allocating 
funds to the [district courts] is driven, in large part, by the number of judicial officers in each 
district.”). 
 202 See id. at 1-2 (explaining the relationship between the district’s budget and the number of 
judgeships in the district). 
 203 HEYDEBRAND & SERON, supra note 46, at 94 (“[T]he size of the court’s total personnel 
resources is explained, in large part, by the combined effect of the governmental sector (b* = .69) 
and civil filings (b* = .23).”). 
 204 See Carol J. Mills & Wayne E. Bohannon, Juror Characteristics: To What Extent Are They 
Related to Jury Verdicts?, 64 JUDICATURE 22, 25 (1980) (examining the relationship between jury 
decisionmaking and juror characteristics such as race, age, gender, and education). 
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The notion of selling justice is abhorrent to notions of equity and fair-play.205 
Courts and judges in the United States have vehemently and consistently 
rejected such an idea. The courts have successfully limited corruption in 
judicial dealings through a number of mechanisms. 
One of the most important of these corruption-deterring mechanisms is 
appellate review.206 If a trial court judge or an entire court were to dole out 
justice without reliance on sound legal principles, the appellate court 
assigned to review the case would quickly reverse the trial court’s decision. 
This second look at cases limits a trial court’s ability to increase filings by 
always siding with the plaintiff. In essence, the trial courts can be thought 
to operate in a heavily regulated environment. Even if a court desired to 
explicitly offer successful outcomes to plaintiffs, it could not do so because 
judicial checks are built into the system. 
But district courts that are interested in impacting venue decisions have 
some tools at their disposal. In general, by decreasing the uncertainty and 
risk inherent in litigation in ways favorable to plaintiffs, courts can try to 
compete with other courts for those litigants. If a court or a judge can 
increase the odds of success for plaintiffs (even slightly) and signal that fact 
to future plaintiffs, the court may be successful in attracting cases to its 
court. 
One way to attract plaintiffs is to offer appealing procedural rules that 
are not offered by other courts. Even though all district courts are bound by 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a number of district courts have 
adopted additional procedural rules for patent cases—called patent local 
rules (PLRs)—often in an attempt to attract litigants.207 Some litigants 
prefer litigating in districts with PLRs because case scheduling and 
discovery proceed in a more predictable manner than they might otherwise. 
Some litigants prefer PLRs because they may inherently favor their side. 
A second way to attract litigants is by offering more predictable case 
management procedures than other courts. Case management refers to a 
court’s administrative oversight of the litigation process.208 Decisions 
 
 205 See Ian Ayres, The Twin Faces of Judicial Corruption: Extortion and Bribery, 74 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 1231, 1235 (1997) (“[A] judge’s action in agreeing to receive money is morally repugnant 
regardless of whether the agreement is an extortion or a bribe.”). 
 206 See generally Paul D. Carrington, The Power of District Judges and the Responsibility of Courts 
of Appeals, 3 GA. L. REV. 507 (1969) (examining the role of appellate review in United States 
federal courts). 
 207 For a discussion of the history of patent local rules, see Ware & Davy, supra note 110. 
 208 See PETER S. MENELL ET AL., PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL GUIDE 1-2 (2d 
ed. 2012) (discussing the importance of judicial oversight of patent cases to avoid excessive 
burdens on the court).  
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concerning the flow and process of litigation are often insulated from 
appellate review by the abuse of discretion standard.209 While case 
management decisions are often not reviewable or are reviewed with a high 
level of deference on appeal, they can be extremely important to litigants. 
For instance, a judge’s decision on the length of time for or the scope of the 
discovery process can at times be as important as a decision on a legal 
issue.210 Judges and courts establish discovery norms. If predictable, those 
discovery norms can appeal to plaintiffs and encourage more filings. 
Because district courts control most case management decisions and 
those decisions can be important to litigants, one would expect such 
decisions to be a primary way in which district courts seek to attract 
litigation to their courtrooms. This is precisely what has occurred in patent 
law. 
 
a. Procedural Distinctions: Patent Local Rules 
Among the forum-shopping factors that districts can control, perhaps 
none is as effective at signaling a district’s interest in attracting patent 
litigants as the creation of patent local rules.211 Patent local rules establish 
procedural rules and schedules for the handling of patent cases in a district. 
In districts with PLRs, litigants know ex ante the general format and 
timeline that any potential patent suit might take. For the great majority of 
litigants interested in reducing uncertainty, PLRs can be very appealing. 
In 2000, the Northern District of California became the first district 
court to adopt patent local rules.212 The Northern District’s PLRs 
established standards for initial case management conferences,213 required 
heightened pleading standards,214 and set a detailed schedule for managing 
the claim construction portion of patent cases.215 Numerous districts have 
 
 209 See Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642 (1976) (per 
curiam) (adopting the abuse of discretion standard in a case dismissed for discovery violations). 
 210 See also Richard L. Marcus, E-Discovery Beyond the Federal Rules, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 321, 
334-36 (2008) (discussing the importance of the scope of e-discovery in commercial disputes, 
marital litigation, personal injury, and trade secret theft and the impact on the underlying 
litigation). 
 211 See McKelvie, supra note 160, at 3 (explaining that while adopting local rules may not 
necessarily increase patent filings, it indicates that judges are more familiar with patent cases and 
are more open to trying them). 
 212 Ware & Davy, supra note 110, at 979. 
 213 Id. at 980. 
 214 Id. at 983-84. 
 215 Id. at 996-98. 
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followed the lead of the Northern District of California in adopting 
PLRs.216 
Of course, not all plaintiffs prefer filing in districts with PLRs. One of 
the leading venues for patent litigation over the last decade—the Central 
District of California—does not have formalized patent rules, but the 
district has consistently drawn large numbers of patent cases to its courts.217 
A large population and concentration of technology companies is likely the 
primary driver of the popularity of the Central District, but some have 
argued that the flexibility of a court that is not bound by the strict timeline 
of PLRs can attract litigants who may want to propose alternative schedules 
and timeframes to the court.218 
Adopting local rules does not guarantee that patent litigants will 
suddenly prefer a particular district court. The Western District of 
Pennsylvania adopted local rules in 2005 in an effort to signal its desire to 
hear more patent cases.219 The district has not seen a significant increase in 
patent filings since that time.220 Other districts, including the Western 
District of Tennessee, the Western District of North Carolina, the District 
of Idaho, and the District of New Hampshire, have adopted PLRs in an 
effort to attract litigants, but with little success.221 
Indeed, although PLRs may serve as a signal that a district court is 
interested in attracting patent cases, adopting PLRs has generally failed to 
increase filings in a district. Empirical evidence has found no correlation 
between adoption of PLRs and an increase in patent case volume.222 In 
some ways, PLRs represent an announcement that a district court is 
 
 216 Id. at 1011. 
 217 See Erin Coe, Central Calif. Tops Eastern Texas as Patent Hot Spot, LAW360 ( July 7, 2010, 
4:31 PM), http://www.law360.com/topnews/articles/163315/central-calif-tops-eastern-texas-as-patent-
hot-spot, archived at http://perma.cc/NK8R-62QR (“The Central District of California is also a 
sought-after jurisdiction for plaintiffs because, unlike the Eastern District of Texas, it does not 
have local patent rules and provides more opportunities for parties to quickly resolved [sic] their 
disputes . . . .”). 
 218 See id. (quoting Mark Scarsi, head of Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP’s West 
Coast IP litigation team, as saying that “[t]he Central District of California is more flexible, and 
parties are free to propose different procedures to put issues to the court earlier”). 
 219 See Nguyen, supra note 168, at 487 (detailing the Western District of Pennsylvania’s 
efforts to attract patent cases); see also Henry M. Sneath & Robert O. Lindefjeld, Fast Track Patent 
Litigation: Toward More Procedural Certainty and Cost Control, 73 DEF. COUNS. J. 201, 201 (2006) 
(stating that the Western District of Pennsylvania hoped its PLRs would draw “a larger share of 
the regional and national patent litigation claims” to its courtrooms). 
 220 McKelvie, supra note 160, at 3. 
 221 See generally La Belle, supra note 10. 
 222 See Vogel, supra note 179, at 2-3 (describing a study that found no significant difference in 
caseloads between districts after PLRs were adopted). 
  
670    University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 163: 631 
 
interested in hearing patent cases. While courts can advertise their interest, 
plaintiffs are generally in control of the venue decision—at least until a 
court considers transfer. 
 
b. Case Management Distinctions 
The second major category of tools that courts can employ when 
competing for litigants is the administrative management of their cases. 
There are many ways that a court might devise attractive or repellant case 
management practices. This subsection will focus on four practices that 
have been employed successfully in court competition for patent cases: (1) 
case assignment procedures, (2) trial philosophy, (3) reluctance to transfer, 
and (4) speed. 
 
i. Case Assignment Procedure: The Ability to Judge Shop 
As any experienced litigator will tell you, the judge assigned to a case is 
more important than the district in which the case is filed.223 Certain judges 
have reputations for being irrational, curmudgeonly, or unfair while others 
are viewed as even-handed, fair, or easy-going.224 Most districts have 
procedures for assigning cases that limit the ability of any particular 
plaintiff to select any particular judge.225 This system does not guarantee 
fairness, but it attempts to ensure that each case has roughly the same odds 
of landing before any particular judge. 
If a court intends to attract filings, however, eliminating or reducing the 
random nature of case assignments can help.226 Two districts, the Eastern 
District of Texas and the Eastern District of Virginia, have tinkered with 
their case assignment procedures with an eye toward impacting patent 
litigation filings. As detailed in subsection II.A.2.c, supra, the Eastern 
District of Virginia reconfigured its judge assignment procedures in 
 
 223 One need look no further for proof of this maxim than that judge shopping receives 
universal contempt, whereas forum shopping gets mixed reviews. See Kimberly Jade Norwood, 
Shopping for a Venue: The Need for More Limits on Choice, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 267, 300-01 (1996) 
(comparing the judicial system’s differing views on forum shopping and judge shopping).  
 224 See Weyman I. Lundquist, The New Art of Forum Shopping, 11 LITIG. 21, 22 (1985) 
(discussing forum shopping strategies used to avoid “Judge Curmudgeon”). 
 225 See, e.g., United States v. Mavroules, 798 F. Supp. 61, 61 (D. Mass. 1992) (noting that 
random assignment “prevents judge shopping by any party, thereby enhancing public confidence 
in the assignment process”). 
 226 Lynn LoPucki demonstrated that the single-judge nature of Delaware’s bankruptcy court 
was a boon for attracting litigants in the 1990s because litigants who filed in Delaware knew the 
judge for their case ex ante. See generally LOPUCKI, supra note 17. 
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2002.227 The district’s new assignment procedure increased the uncertainty 
of judge and divisional assignment of patent cases—and only patent 
cases.228 The increased unpredictability of judge assignment has reduced 
the appeal of the district to patent litigants, which was the goal behind the 
amended procedure.229 
Like the Eastern District of Virginia, the Eastern District of Texas has, 
over the years, modified its case assignment procedure for patent cases. 
Unlike its counterpart in Virginia, however, the Eastern District of Texas 
altered its procedures with an eye towards increasing the district’s appeal to 
patent plaintiffs. 
The Eastern District of Texas is split into six divisions: Texarkana, 
Marshall, Sherman, Beaumont, Tyler, and Lufkin.230 Because the district 
can have up to eight active judges, a random case assignment procedure 
would force litigants to risk assignment to a judge who has handled 
relatively few patent cases or who dislikes patent cases entirely.231 To reduce 
the risk of drawing an unsatisfactory judge for a patent case, the Eastern 
District has adopted a case assignment system that allows plaintiffs, in some 
instances, to select a particular judge. 
The district’s case assignment system is nominally random.232 However, 
the Chief Judge, in accordance with his powers under 28 U.S.C. § 137, 
periodically issues general orders that modify the percentage of divisional 
cases that are assigned to particular judges.233 The patent case assignment 
proportions in the Eastern District of Texas differ from the general civil 
case assignment proportions: a particular judge might be assigned 50% of 
the general civil cases filed in Texarkana division, yet be assigned 100% of 
the patent cases filed there.234 
 
 227 See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
 228 See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 229 See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
 230 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT: EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, 
http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/page1.shtml?location=info (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/7YB6-9FC8. 
 231 See Mike McKool, Founder of McKool Smith in Dallas, TEX. LAW., http://www.texaslawyer.com/ 
id=1202520214208 (lasted visited Feb. __, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/ETE2-H7LM 
(espousing lawyers’ fear that Judge Marcia Crane would preside over their patent case since she 
had little experience and seemed not to like patent cases). 
 232 Brooke Terpening, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Analysis of H.R. 5418, 4 FLA. 
INT’L U. L. REV. 287, 311 (2008). 
 233 See id. at 311-12 (explaining that the fixed percentage of cases the Chief Judge assigns to 
each judge depends on “shifting workloads, recusals, new appointments, and retirements”). 
 234 See id. 
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Examining the most recent general order reveals numerous ways to 
choose a particular judge in the Eastern District of Texas. If a litigant 
prefers Judge Clark, for example, he or she need only file the case in either 
Beaumont or Lufkin because Judge Clark is assigned 100% of patent cases 
filed in those districts.235 Before the most recent update of the district’s 
assignment procedures in April 2014, one could file a patent case in the 
Tyler division and enjoy a 95% chance of drawing Judge Davis (the other 
5% of patent cases were assigned to Judge Schneider).236 Before Judge 
Ward—one of the most experienced patent district court jurists in the 
United States—stepped down from the bench, one could file in Marshall or 
Texarkana, where he drew 100% of the patent cases filed.237 Judge Gilstrap, 
who previously had the heaviest patent caseload in the country, presides 
over all cases filed in the Marshall Division.238 
The result of this unique judge assignment system for patent cases is a 
predictable formula litigants can use to select their preferred jurist. Some 
regular patent infringement plaintiffs, including non-practicing entities, 
consistently file in a single division to have their cases heard before the 
same judge.239 Indeed, as can be seen from the table below, two divisions 
receive a disproportionate amount of the patent filings in the district: 
filings in Tyler and Marshall consist of 91% of all patent filings in the 










 235 General Order Assigning Civil and Criminal Actions 11-2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2011), 
available at http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/view_document.cgi?document=20087. 
 236 Id. 
 237 General Order Assigning Civil and Criminal Actions 08-15 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2008), 
available at http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/view_document.cgi?document=1925. 
 238 General Order Assigning Civil and Criminal Actions 14-8 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 2, 2014), 
available at http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/view_document.cgi?document=24426. 
 239 See Leychkis, supra note 106, at 214 (explaining that the Eastern District of Texas has 
become the district of choice for patent trolls who prefer the local juries and the ability to bring 
almost all of their cases before the same judge). 
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Table 1: Eastern District of Texas Case Filings By Division 2012240 
 
Division Cases % of All Plaintiffs Defendants 
Beaumont 24 1.9% 31 104
Marshall 600 47.4% 710 1101
Sherman 58 4.6% 73 121
Tyler 562 44.4% 864 1258
Lufkin 22 1.7% 22 58
Total for All 
Divisions 
1266 100% 1700 2642
 
Because the district’s case assignment system permits judge shopping, 
many non-practicing entities consistently select the same judge. In fact, 
since 1999, Data Treasury Corporation, Orion IP, and IAP Intermodal have 
collectively filed thirty-seven patent suits in the district.241 Each company 
has filed every one of their lawsuits before a single judge: Data Treasury’s 
cases have all been heard by Judge Folsom, Orion’s by Judge Davis, and 
IAP’s by Judge Ward.242 
The ratio of patent cases assigned to each judge is constantly changing 
in the Eastern District of Texas.243 But it is generally true that at any 
particular time at least one division will send all of its patent cases to one 
judge.244 Likewise, it is almost always true that each division has no more 
than two judges handling the patent cases filed in any particular district.245 
This situation permits litigants to have much more control over one of the 
primary motivations behind forum shopping: drawing the most 
advantageous judge possible. Indeed, the assignment system in the Eastern 
District of Texas permits litigants to move beyond forum shopping to judge 
shopping. In contrast with forum shopping, which has both critics and 
 
 240 James C. Pistorino, 2012 Trends in Patent Case Filings and Venue: Eastern District of Texas 
Most Popular for Plaintiffs (Again) But 11 Percent Fewer Defendants Named Nationwide, PERKINS 
COIE, Feb. 2013, at 10 tbl.4, available at http://www.perkinscoie.com/images/content/2/8/v2/ 
28227/lit-13-02pistorino-2012article.pdf. 
 241 Leychkis, supra note 106, at 215 tbl.8. 
 242 Id. 
 243 Previous divisions of labor allowed even more blatant judge shopping. See, e.g., General 
Order Assigning Civil and Criminal Actions 09-20 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/view_document.cgi?document=2256 (assigning many cases 
from one district to only one judge).  
 244 Compare General Order, supra note 235, with General Order, supra note 237. 
 245 Compare General Order, supra note 235, with General Order, supra note 237. 
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defenders, judge shopping is almost universally condemned by both 
commentators and judges themselves.246 
 
ii. Preference for Trials 
Some courts gain a reputation as being particularly open to staging 
trials. Most patentees want to have the threat of reaching trial, as juries are 
more likely than judges to uphold patent validity and find patents 
infringed.247 Thus, districts that are seen as more likely to advance a case to 
trial tend to be more attractive venues for patentee plaintiffs.248 
The Eastern District of Texas and the District of Delaware are the top 
two venues for litigants seeking trial, or at least the threat of trial.249 On 
average, 2.8% of U.S. patent cases reach trial, but in those two districts 8% 
and 11.8% of patent cases, respectively, reach a final decision before a jury or 
judge.250 The Western District of Wisconsin and the Eastern District of 
Virginia, two other districts with sizable patent dockets, follow closely 
behind with 7.4% and 6.4% of cases reaching trial.251 
Courts can establish norms that preference trials in a number of ways. 
First, some courts—such as Delaware—obtain a reputation for conservative 
application of summary judgment.252 When faced with a dispositive 
summary judgment motion, judges in Delaware are more likely to err on 
the side of caution and send the case to trial than other courts. And some of 
the summary judgment precautions in Delaware are unique to patent cases. 
For example, some judges in Delaware require additional “screening 
procedures” for summary judgment motions in patent cases.253 Those 
screening procedures include requiring parties to submit briefs to seek 
 
 246 See Norwood, supra note 223, at 299-300 (“[J]udge-shopping is still ‘universally 
condemned’ by the courts.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 247 See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated 
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 212 tbl.3 (1998) (finding that patentees win 67% of jury verdicts on 
validity but only 28% of pretrial motions); Lemley, supra note 2, at 403 (explaining that when 
patent owners select a forum, “[t]hey know that most summary judgment rulings favor defendants 
in patent cases, but that juries tend to be far more pro-patentee”). 
 248 See id. 
 249 Id. at 411 tbl.4. 
 250 Id. 
 251 Id. 
 252 See Lee, supra note 138 (observing that Delaware judges are “relatively slow to rule on 
summary judgment motions,” which increases litigation costs for defendants and gives plaintiffs 
the upper hand in settlement negotiations). 
 253 See Parsons, supra note 135, at 157 (describing the additional procedural requirements 
prescribed by Judge Sleet and former Judge Farnan for summary judgment motions in patent 
cases). 
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permission to file summary judgment motions and certified statements 
assuring the court that no material factual dispute exists.254 The additional 
layers of procedural complexity required to file for summary judgment in 
Delaware partially explain the low rates of patent cases that terminate at 
the summary judgment stage.255 
Second, a court can encourage trial by expediting the process of getting 
to trial. For litigants, time is money. The longer a case drags out before 
trial, the greater incentive there is for both sides to settle. Courts with 
reputations as “rocket dockets” (such as the Eastern District of Virginia and 
the Western District of Wisconsin) likely get to trial more often than most 
courts simply because trials tend to occur more quickly in those courts.256 
Third, courts can strictly enforce calendar dates established before trial or 
in PLRs. The Eastern District of Texas has a reputation for inflexibility on 
trial delays and calendaring changes, while the Central District of 
California is much less inclined to get to trial and often delays cases for 
relatively long periods of time.257 
 
iii. Reluctance to Transfer 
Judges have a great deal of discretion in deciding motions to transfer 
venue.258 Transfer is permitted when doing so is in the “interest of 
justice.”259 Certain district courts have developed a reputation as unwilling 
to transfer cases to another forum. Forums that have obtained such a 
reputation are more appealing to patentees because their initial choice of 
forum is likely to be the final forum. 
The Eastern District of Virginia transfers a higher percentage of its 
patent cases to other forums than most districts.260 Forum shopping 
plaintiffs are well aware of a court’s likelihood to transfer a case. After all, 
 
 254 Id. 
 255 See id. at 156-57 (noting that in 2003 and 2004, “the vast majority” of summary judgment 
motions were denied in Delaware and, of those that were granted, none disposed of the entire 
case). 
 256 See supra subsection II.A.2.c; see also Lemley, supra note 2, at 414-15 tbl.5 (organizing 
district courts according to speed in reaching an ultimate disposition of the case with the Western 
District of Wisconsin and the Eastern District of Virginia topping the list). 
 257 See Coe, supra note 217 (contrasting the strict schedule in the Eastern District of Texas 
with the more flexible schedule in the Central District of California). 
 258 See Moore, supra note 5, at 898 (“[T]ransfer is a complicated inquiry very much at the 
discretion of the district court.”). 
 259 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012). 
 260 See Moore, supra note 5, at 909, 915-16 (suggesting that patent plaintiffs file in the 
Eastern District of Virginia due to judicial efficiency and expertise, which explains why the high 
percentage (16%) of cases are transferred for lacking any connection to the forum). 
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the real advantage of forum shopping is undermined if the chosen court 
simply transfers the case to a less desirable forum. 
On the other hand, the most popular current destinations for patent 
plaintiffs—the Eastern District of Texas and the District of Delaware—
both have reputations as districts that are unlikely to grant transfer 
motions.261 That reputation likely reassures forum shopping plaintiffs. Until 
very recently, the Federal Circuit has chosen not to interfere with district 
court venue selection. In fact, before 2008, the Federal Circuit consistently 
interpreted the patent venue statute quite broadly.262 Prior to December 
2008, the Federal Circuit had never, in its twenty-six years of existence, 
reversed a district court’s denial of a motion to transfer venue.263 
Since 2008, however, the Federal Circuit has taken a much more active 
interest in venue disputes. The Federal Circuit entered the forum selection 
fray following a decision from the Fifth Circuit overturning the Eastern 
District of Texas’s denial of a transfer motion in a products liability 
lawsuit.264 In a surprise move, the Federal Circuit granted a mandamus 
appeal to review a denial of a motion to transfer out of the Eastern District 
of Texas in In re TS Tech USA Corp.265 Since TS Tech, the Federal Circuit 
has granted mandamus review on seven motions to transfer.266 All but one 
of the mandamus actions have arisen out of the Eastern District of Texas. 
The outlier involved a decision by the Northern District of California to 
grant a transfer motion into the Eastern District of Texas.267 
 
 261 See, e.g., Offen-Brown, supra note 104, at 73 (noting that until 2008, “it was difficult to 
obtain transfer” from jurisdictions like the Eastern District of Texas); Parsons, supra note 135, at 
151 (“Transfer motions in Delaware are rarely granted.”). But see Paul M. Janicke, Venue Transfers 
from the Eastern District of Texas: Case by Case or an Endemic Problem?, LANDSLIDE, Mar.–Apr. 
2010, at 16, 16 (finding that the percentage of patent cases transferred by the Eastern District of 
Texas “was about the same” as the average nationwide in 2006 and “significantly more” in 2007).  
 262 See Moore, supra note 5, at 936 (lamenting the Federal Circuit’s conclusion that the 
patent venue provisions are coextensive with personal jurisdiction with respect to corporate 
defendants, rendering the patent venue statute “superfluous”). 
 263 Paul R. Gugliuzza, The New Federal Circuit Mandamus, 45 IND. L. REV. 343, 346 (2012). 
 264 See In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 309 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc) 
(“Concluding that the district court gave undue weight to the plaintiffs’ choice of venue, ignored 
our precedents, misapplied the law, and misapprehended the relevant facts, [the court] hold[s] 
that the district court reached a patently erroneous result and clearly abused its discretion in 
denying the transfer.”). 
 265 551 F.3d 1315, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  
 266 See In re Microsoft Corp., 630 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Vistaprint Ltd., 628 F.3d 
1342 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Zimmer Holdings, Inc., 609 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Nintendo, 
Co., 589 F.3d 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 587 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2009); 
In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 267 See In re Aliphcom, 449 F. App’x 33 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
  




Another case management norm that deserves discussion is that of 
speedy adjudication. Some districts have made the speed with which they 
dispense justice an integral part of the district’s culture. The Eastern 
District of Virginia has consistently been one of the most efficient places in 
the country to try civil cases over the past three decades.268 In order to 
become a “rocket docket,” the district adopted hard rules for setting trial 
conferences and dates.269 The Western District of Wisconsin has also 
become known as a particularly fast place in which to litigate cases. For 
patent cases, both districts average less than eight months to resolution and 
less than a year to reach trial.270 
For many patent plaintiffs, speed kills; the faster a court conducts its 
business, the faster a defendant must decide whether to risk a jury decision 
or settle.271 Therefore, Western Wisconsin and Eastern Virginia are 
attractive locations in which to litigate for a wide variety of litigants who 
want to quickly resolve their dispute. But the appeal of a rocket docket can 
often be self-limiting. When more and more patent cases clog a docket, it 
becomes more difficult to maintain the status as a rocket docket. The 
Eastern District of Virginia, in particular, began to be flooded with patent 
litigation that threatened its status as an efficient purveyor of services.272 
Judges from both the Eastern District of Virginia and the Western District 
of Wisconsin have expressed dismay at the drag that a high number of 
patent cases inflict on the speed of their civil docket.273 
 
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF COURT COMPETITION 
Judges and courts can, if they want, influence litigants’ venue choice in 
patent cases. When courts are so inclined, they can attempt to attract or 
dissuade patent litigants from filing in their courts by altering 
 
 268 See supra subsection II.A.2.c. 
 269 See Koenig, supra note 143, at 803 n.25 (recounting the changes brought about by Judge 
Walter E. Hoffman designed to remove the case backlog and relieve the overburdened docket in 
the Eastern District of Virginia). 
 270 See Lemley, supra note 2, at 414 tbl.5, 416 tbl.6 (showing the Western District of 
Wisconsin and Eastern District of Virginia to have the shortest times to resolution and shortest 
times to trial among districts with twenty-five or more outcomes). 
 271 See id. at 413 (noting that plaintiffs are interested in speedy resolutions to keep costs 
down and to get quick relief in addition to building a war chest to sue other defendants). 
 272 See supra subsection II.A.2.c. 
 273 See supra notes 147 and 172 and accompanying text. 
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administrative procedures in predictable ways that increase a plaintiff ’s 
odds of achieving his or her goals. The previous Part should make clear, 
however, that court competition differs in important ways from forum 
shopping. Ultimately, court competition is a prelude to forum shopping: 
courts or judges can establish case management norms that have the 
potential to influence venue choices, but litigants retain the ultimate ability 
to select venue. 
This Part will discuss the implications of court competition for patent 
law and for specialized legal areas more generally. This Part concludes with 
an examination of potential randomization proposals for reducing the 
forum shopping and court competition problems in patent law. 
 
A. The Cost of Court Competition 
It should be noted at the outset of any discussion of the drawbacks of 
court competition that some scholars have argued in favor of court 
competition. For instance, Xuan-Thao Nguyen has argued that the rise of 
the Eastern District of Texas as a preeminent location for patent litigation 
has improved the patent system as a whole.274 According to Nguyen, the 
appeal of the Eastern District of Texas stems from aspects of the district 
that are outcome neutral.275 Nguyen claims that litigants are attracted to the 
Eastern District of Texas because of the knowledgeable and welcoming 
jurists in the district, the district’s reputation for fairness and 
reasonableness, its customer-oriented approach, and its unbiased jury 
pool.276 As evidence of the improvement, Nguyen offers a number of 
examples of litigants who were pleased with their experience before the 
judges of the Eastern District.277 Scholars in other areas of the law have 
made similar claims. In the bankruptcy context, scholars have argued that 
Delaware’s successful bid to attract bankruptcy cases has led to salutary 
effects on the bankruptcy system, including increased judicial expertise and 
efficiency.278 
 
 274 Nguyen, supra note 91, at 155 (suggesting that instead of transforming the venue rules to 
stop forum shopping, reformers should look to the Eastern District of Texas as an example of a 
court transforming itself “into a knowledgeable center with strong expertise in solving patent 
disputes”). 
 275 Id. at 136-37 (citing examples of judges’ expertise and local rules that enhance fairness in 
the judicial process). 
 276 Id. at 136-43. 
 277 See, e.g., id. at 138-39 (detailing the successful and pleasant experience of one of the lead 
counsels for Intel Corporation in a case tried in the Eastern District of Texas). 
 278 See, e.g., Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Whither the Race? A Comment on the 
Effects of the Delawarization of Corporate Reorganizations, 54 VAND. L. REV. 283, 289-90 (2001) 
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Proponents of court competition, however, rely on a shaky premise, 
namely, that courts competing for litigation will not bend the adjudicative 
process to favor one group of litigants over another. While this is almost 
certainly true in most cases, it is also almost certainly not true in every case. 
Indeed, courts that create favorable environments for plaintiffs are more 
likely to win a competition for litigants than courts that maintain a more 
neutral environment. Plaintiffs prefer courts that offer greater odds of 
success. In essence, a competition for litigants favors courts that can offer 
the most predictable advantages to one side. Thus, if one recognizes that 
court competition will reward courts that favor plaintiffs, such competition 
has the pernicious effect of undermining the ultimate fairness of the legal 
process while simultaneously reducing confidence in the legal system. 
Although Nguyen’s claims about the value of expertise are undoubtedly 
true, the development of that expertise likely came at the expense of 
evenhanded resolution of patent disputes, at least initially. Critics of the 
early practices of the Eastern District of Texas point to the courts’ excessive 
damage awards, inflexible and expensive discovery schedule, and reluctance 
to transfer cases as examples of plaintiff-friendly rules that led to the rise of 
the patent troll.279 While the current court appears to be much more 
evenhanded in its handling of cases, the early years of the court left much 
to be desired.280 If the court had not been extremely plaintiff-friendly in its 
case management practices, it is unlikely that the judges in the district 
would have been able to develop the expertise they now possess. Indeed, 
the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court have taken steps to rein in the 
Eastern District of Texas’s ability to attract litigants.281 
A separate group of scholars has noted the legal innovation that can 
occur when courts share jurisdiction with other courts. For instance, Craig 
Nard and John Duffy have recently proposed an end to the Federal Circuit’s 
exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases.282 If patent appeals were heard at 
 
(disputing the suggestion that adjudicating a large proportion of major corporate bankruptcies in 
Delaware is bad for social welfare); David A. Skeel, Jr., What’s So Bad About Delaware?, 54 VAND. 
L. REV. 309, 325-29 (2001) (describing the “virtues of Delaware” including the ability of Delaware 
judges to use their expertise to change quickly and refine their regulatory efforts). 
 279 See generally J. Jason Williams et al., Strategies for Combating Patent Trolls, 17 J. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 367 (2010) (discussing mechanisms used by districts such as the Eastern District of 
Texas that encourage patent troll behavior). 
 280 See id. at 368-69 (noting that plaintiffs were 20% more likely to secure favorable 
judgments in the Eastern District of Texas than the nationwide average). 
 281 See, e.g., supra notes 258-67 and accompanying text (discussing recent action by the 
Federal Circuit in considering writs of mandamus for transfer of venue). 
 282 See Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 
NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1650 (2007). 
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various circuit courts, they argue, there would be greater experimentation 
in patent jurisprudence that would lead to beneficial results for the patent 
system.283 
However, this group of scholars is speaking of a different sort of 
competition than the one addressed in this Article. Those scholars are 
addressing the optimal balance of power concentration between specialized 
and generalist appellate courts.284 They are largely addressing decisions that 
are made by appellate courts rather than trial courts. In the appellate 
context, there are benefits to be had from a decentralized, multi-court 
structure, including the ability to develop and test different legal 
approaches to the same problem.285 Instead of competing for litigation 
business and the accompanying expertise that comes with winning that 
competition, appellate courts can “compete” in the sense of crafting legal 
rules that best embody legislative policies. And the extent of such 
competition is easily checked: legal innovations by appellate courts—which 
often lead to “circuit splits”—are often reviewed by the Supreme Court.286 
Conversely, district court administrative processes, such as case assignment 
and case management procedures, are rarely studied and almost never 
reviewed by appellate courts. Because of this, such procedures present a 
perfect vehicle for engaging in competition for litigants. 
Successful competition for litigants can certainly lead to expertise; the 
Eastern District of Texas now has some of the most experienced and 
seasoned patent trial judges in the country. But such expertise often comes 
with a price. The Eastern District’s meteoric rise as an exceptional patent 
court has met with harsh criticism from the bar. Indeed, Justice Scalia has 
referred to the district as a “renegade jurisdiction[].”287 
 
B. Court Competition as a Feature of Specialized Adjudication 
Patent law is not alone in fostering competition among courts. Indeed, 
beginning in the 1980s, courts in Delaware and New York sought to attract 
bankruptcy filers with many of the same tools that the Eastern District of 
Texas and others would employ decades later in an effort to attract patent 
 
 283 See id. at 1651-55 (arguing that a decentralized model would result in “new ideas and 
approaches to challenges facing our patent system”). 
 284 See id. at 1626-27 & nn.31-36 (discussing scholarly works looking at the concentration of 
power in areas such as the separation of powers doctrine, federalism, and international law). 
 285 Id. at 1653. 
 286 See id. (discussing the role of percolation in appellate review in order to create sound 
binding precedent). 
 287 Nguyen, supra note 91, at 112. 
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litigants.288 Bankruptcy cases, like other federal cases, are heard before 
federal district courts. However, all districts have standing orders that refer 
bankruptcy cases to the bankruptcy court within each district.289 A district 
court may choose to hear the case itself,290 but in practice this rarely 
occurs.291 In essence, bankruptcy courts are specialized courts within the 
district courts. Appeals of bankruptcy court decisions go to the district 
court in which the case arose and then to the circuit court of appeals for 
that district.292 
From 1974 to 1978, Congress made a comprehensive revision of the 
bankruptcy code, including a change to the bankruptcy venue statute.293 
The new statute stated that “a [bankruptcy] case . . . may be 
commenced in the district court for the district in which the domicile, 
residence, principal place of business . . . or principal assets . . . of 
the person or entity” are located.294 By the 1990s, judicial interpretations of 
the venue statute had liberalized bankruptcy venue to the point where large 
public corporations were largely free to file in any bankruptcy court in the 
United States.295 
From 1980 to 1986, 32% of “big-case bankruptc[ies]” were filed in New 
York courts.296 Much of the appeal of New York’s bankruptcy courts was 
based on geography; firms entering bankruptcy often have major operations 
in New York and the majority of bankruptcy professionals (lawyers, 
 
 288 See LOPUCKI, supra note 17, at 25-76 (describing how New York and Delaware courts 
became attractive venues for bankruptcy litigation). 
 289 See Allen R. Kamp, Court Structure Under the Bankruptcy Code, 90 COM. L.J. 203, 208 
(1985) (“[A]ll districts have promulgated a general order referring all bankruptcy cases to the 
bankruptcy judges.”). 
 290 See id. (analyzing § 157(d) of the 1984 Bankruptcy Code and considering instances in 
which a district court may withdraw a bankruptcy case). 
 291 See id. at 208-09 (noting that a case may be withdrawn for cause and that the legislative 
history indicates that withdrawal should only be used sparingly). 
 292 Id. at 210-11. 
 293 See Martin I. Klein, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 5 (1979) 
(outlining the changes to the jurisdiction and venue provisions including giving the district courts 
original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under Title 11, which is delegated in turn to the 
bankruptcy court). 
 294 28 U.S.C. § 1408(1) (2012). 
 295 See LOPUCKI, supra note 17, at 15; see also, e.g., In re Ocean Props. of Del., Inc., 95 B.R. 
304, 305-07 (Bankr. D. Del. 1988) (granting a motion to transfer venue from Delaware, the state of 
incorporation, to Florida, the location where the business is conducted); In re Del. & Hudson Ry. 
Co., 96 B.R. 467, 467 (Bankr. D. Del. 1988) (noting that venue was proper in both Delaware and 
New York for a Delaware corporation with corporate offices in New York). 
 296 LOPUCKI, supra note 17, at 47-48.  
  
682    University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 163: 631 
 
accounting firms, and financial advisors) were located there.297 But New 
York’s appeal went beyond geographic convenience. New York bankruptcy 
courts tended to rule for bankruptcy filers on three key issues: extensions of 
exclusivity,298 attorneys’ fees,299 and first-day orders.300 The handling of 
those largely procedural issues (as well as an unusual case assignment 
method301) drove New York bankruptcy dominance. 
New York’s status as the go-to location for large bankruptcy cases, 
however, was short-lived. By the early 1990s, Delaware had become the 
leader in big bankruptcy filings.302 Lynn LoPucki has chronicled how 
Delaware’s emergence as a bankruptcy court of choice was the result of the 
efforts of Delaware’s lone bankruptcy judge, Judge Balick, to attract “a 
major industry to her state.”303 Judge Balick’s case management techniques, 
along with the predictability of case assignment in a one-judge district, 
elevated Delaware to the top district for bankruptcy filings.304 
 
 297 Id. at 40. 
 298 Extensions of exclusivity permit the bankrupt firm to pay nothing to its creditors while 
negotiations continue. Id. at 41. Between 1980 and 1986, New York courts extended exclusivity in 
92% of cases compared with other courts that only extended exclusivity in 73% of cases. Id. 
 299 See id. at 44-45 (noting that New York courts, unlike courts in Philadelphia and Miami, 
rarely restricted hourly attorney rates). 
 300 See id. at 45 (observing that New York courts recognized that “the practicalities of 
operating a business in bankruptcy reorganization were often in conflict with the requirements of 
the Bankruptcy Code” and were thus more accommodating than courts in other cities when such 
conflicts arose). 
 301 LoPucki also noted that the New York courts had some irregularities in the case 
assignment practices that may have appealed to bankruptcy filers. While the state claimed it was 
employing a system of random case assignments, a single jurist, Judge Lifland of the Manhattan 
Division of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, was 
assigned eight of the thirteen cases filed in the five-judge district in 1985. Id. at 46-47. Judge 
Lifland was particularly popular with bankruptcy filers, and he welcomed high profile cases to his 
courtroom. See id. at 46 (“Judge Lifland wanted the big cases, and the debtors’ lawyers wanted 
him to have them. In the early 1980s, New York was the most attractive bankruptcy venue in the 
country, and Burton Lifland was the most attractive judge in that venue.”). Knowing that Judge 
Lifland was likely to be assigned to big bankruptcy cases made filing in the Southern District of 
New York very attractive to potential litigants. 
 302 See id. at 74 (noting that Delaware surpassed New York for number of big bankruptcy 
case filings in 1992). 
 303 Id. at 76; see also id. at 56-74 (arguing that Judge Balick actively pursued bankruptcy 
filings by making rulings favorable to bankruptcy filers).  
 304 Id. at 75 (noting the appeal of filing in a one-judge district). Because of the increase in 
filings, Delaware was awarded a second bankruptcy judge in 1993, although the district did not 
adopt the random case assignment model of New York. Id. at 74-75. The migration of big 
bankruptcy cases towards New York and Delaware alarmed bankruptcy professionals in other 
states. Beginning in Houston, members of affected cities’ local bankruptcy bars approached their 
local bankruptcy judges and asked for changes in local rules and attorney fee rulings to make the 
local courts competitive. Id. at 125-26. 
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Delaware’s bankruptcy court engaged in many of the competitive 
techniques that federal district courts have used to compete for patent 
cases. For instance, the competition for both patent and bankruptcy cases 
has involved small, seemingly unlikely locales as litigation hotspots: 
Marshall, Texas and Wilmington, Delaware for patent cases and 
Wilmington, Delaware for bankruptcy.305 In both instances, courts have 
increased the speed with which they dispose of cases in an effort to attract 
litigants.306 Both bankruptcy and federal district courts have also adopted 
peculiar procedural rules meant to influence venue decisions,307 including 
the elimination of random case assignment308 and a predilection to deny 
motions to transfer.309 The history of court competition for both 
bankruptcy and patent cases involves judges who gain important judicial 
experience,310 as well as the prestige associated with complex and difficult 
cases.311 Both instances demonstrate the importance of forum shopping to 
the local economies in which the respective courts sit.312 
There are, however, some intriguing differences between bankruptcy’s 
experience with court competition and patent law’s experience. For 
instance, some courts, like the Eastern District of Virginia, have sought to 
reduce patent filings in their districts. This does not appear to be the case 
when looking at competition for bankruptcy cases. Furthermore, 
competition in patent cases is unique because it involves generalist judges 
competing for a specialized docket. Federal district court judges are not 
specialists, while bankruptcy judges hear only bankruptcy cases. 
The parallels between district court competition for patent law and 
bankruptcy court competition for bankruptcy cases suggest that the 
creation of specialized courts may play a role in court competition. That 
insight runs counter to the notion in the scholarship that specialized courts 
reduce forum shopping.313 Judicial specialization might contribute to court 
 
 305 Id. at 51-53. 
 306 See id. at 117 (noting that the refiling rate in Delaware is high because “Delaware 
processes cases faster than other jurisdictions”). 
 307 See id. at 125-26 (recounting the requests of Houston lawyers to their local bankruptcy 
judges to make several procedural changes to attract more bankruptcy litigation to the city). 
 308 Id. at 75. 
 309 Id. at 38-39. 
 310 Id. at 39. 
 311 Id. at 19-20. 
 312 See id. at 128-29 (explaining how the increase in bankruptcy filings caused law firms to 
expand in Delaware and impacted the local economy). 
 313 See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 12, at 32 (discussing Congress’s belief that the Federal 
Circuit would eliminate forum shopping); Moore, supra note 5, at 932-34 (arguing for the creation 
of a specialized trial court to eliminate forum shopping); John B. Pegram, Should There Be a U.S. 
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competition in different ways depending on the structure of the specialized 
court. Bankruptcy and patent law have specialized courts at different levels 
of the litigation process: bankruptcy cases are tried before specialist judges 
and appealed to generalist geographic circuit courts; patent cases are tried 
before generalist federal judges and appealed to the specialized Federal 
Circuit. 
Specialization at the appellate level may increase opportunities for court 
competition in two ways: by increasing the relative value of district court 
case management procedures to litigants and by leveling the court 
competition playing field. Part of the attraction of appellate specialization 
(or more precisely, centralization) is the resulting uniformity of the law in 
the specialized area. Since legal disuniformity is the traditional driver of 
forum shopping, it is thought that unifying the law will eliminate (or at 
least reduce) forum shopping. But, when legal differences among fora are 
eliminated, forum shoppers turn their attention to administrative and 
procedural nuances among courts. Distinct, predictable, and favorable 
administrative and procedural practices become increasingly appealing to 
litigants who are unable to shop for distinctions based in law. The 
uniformity of patent law throughout the country forces forum-shopping 
plaintiffs to seek out advantageous case-management norms and procedural 
differences. Before the Federal Circuit existed, those case-management 
norms, while valuable, were overshadowed by the significant differences in 
substantive law among the circuits.314 Thus, courts that are interested in 
competing for litigants may find that the suite of administrative procedures 
they can offer is more attractive to forum-shopping plaintiffs in the Federal 
Circuit era because plaintiffs cannot shop for substantive legal differences. 
The presence of a centralized appellate court for patent cases may also 
level the playing field for courts to compete for litigants, thereby increasing 
the number of district courts that can realistically enter into competition. 
During the pre–Federal Circuit era, only district courts in pro-plaintiff 
circuits (the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits) could realistically compete 
for litigants.315 Even those districts, however, were bound by different 
standards and rules on patent law than other courts in other circuits. Those 
 
Trial Court with a Specialization in Patent Litigation?, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 765, 
770 (2000) (explaining that “rampant forum shopping” was a major cause of the creation of the 
Federal Circuit); Arti K. Rai, Specialized Trial Courts: Concentrating Expertise on Fact, 17 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 877, 877-78 (2002) (recognizing that commentators have suggested that the creation of 
specialized patent trial courts could reduce forum shopping and legal inconsistency at the trial 
level). 
 314 See supra subsection II.A.1.  
 315 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.  
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differences might limit any one districts’ appeal to litigants. Or those 
districts might reside in circuits that had unappealing precedent on 
procedural questions that might be important to particular patent plaintiffs. 
And even then, forces outside of the trial court’s control (such as changes to 
the law, a shift in the appellate court’s support for the patent system) might 
undermine any efforts to attract litigants. The result was that very few (if 
any) district courts could offer the sorts of procedural and administrative 
advantages that would appeal to a significant number of plaintiffs. 
The creation of the Federal Circuit essentially commoditized patent 
litigation. Now, every district court in the country operates with the same 
baseline law and the same court reviewing procedural and discretionary 
decisions.316 That means that any district court that is interested in 
attracting patent cases can attempt to do so without circuit-specific 
limitations. While before the Federal Circuit plaintiffs shopped for law, 
now they shop for trial practices and procedures. 
Specialization at the trial court level may increase court competition in 
different ways than specialization at the appellate level does. Specialized 
trial judges may be more incentivized than generalist judges to compete for 
litigants. In particular, specialized judges may see more value in obtaining 
the reputational benefits that come from increased expertise. Most 
specialized trial judges want to be seen as experts in their specialty; 
bankruptcy judges, presumably, hope to be recognized as experts in 
bankruptcy law. The benefit to a generalist judge of becoming an expert in 
a particular field is less apparent; peer generalist judges are unlikely to be 
impressed by a particular judicial expertise. 
Additionally, specialized trial courts are likely to experience more direct 
bureaucratic rewards when successfully competing for cases than generalist 
courts are. LoPucki has detailed the bureaucratic rewards that the 
bankruptcy court in Delaware received after increasing the court’s caseload, 
namely increased judgeships and money for the court.317 Of course, the 
success with which the Eastern District of Texas and the District of 
Delaware have attracted patent cases demonstrates that specialized courts 
are not the only courts that are incentivized to compete for litigants. But 
 
 316 Although the Federal Circuit formally reviews non-patent procedural questions under the 
law of the geographic circuit, the court has largely looked to its own precedents for procedural 
questions in patent cases. See Dreyfuss, supra note 12, at 30-52 (pointing to confusion caused by 
the Federal Circuit in three specific areas: jurisdiction, adjudication of non-patent aspects of 
cases, and supervision of lower courts in partnership with regional circuits). 
 317 LOPUCKI, supra note 17, at 128-29. 
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specialized trial courts may be particularly motivated to attract cases to 
justify the court’s very existence. 
Another specialized court that handles patent cases provides an 
interesting example. The United States International Trade Commission 
(ITC) is a quasi-judicial federal agency that adjudicates disputes regarding 
U.S. imports.318 The ITC is limited in the remedies it can provide to 
plaintiffs: it cannot grant monetary damages; instead, it can only restrict 
imports of products that infringe a valid U.S. patent. Despite that 
limitation, the ITC receives a large number of patent cases every year, 
reaching a high of seventy cases in 2011, before averaging just over forty 
over the past two years.319 The ITC’s importance in the patent system has 
increased significantly in the past decade.320 The administrative law judges 
(ALJs) of the ITC are considered specialists in patent law. The ALJs are 
also highly aware of the impact that their patent caseload has on certain 
bureaucratic matters, namely ITC judgeships and courtroom space. For 
instance, in the ITC’s annual report, the Commission has said that the 
significant increase of cases over the past five years has led to “[a] shortage 
of courtrooms,” which has “hampered scheduling of evidentiary 
hearings.”321 The courtroom shortage due to the increased caseload led to 
the acquisition of additional space and the construction of a new courtroom 
in October 2012.322 Similarly, former Chief Administrative Law Judge Paul 
Luckern has noted that he thinks the ITC currently has enough judges 
(six), “[b]ut things could change. The caseload could increase.”323 The 
judges on the ITC are aware that increased caseloads lead directly to 
increased judgeships and other potential benefits to the Commission, such 
as new courtrooms. That sort of direct link between increased caseloads of a 
 
 318 See About the USITC, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.usitc.gov/ 
press_room/about_usitc.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/6QBK-U67C.  
 319 See U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, FACTS AND TRENDS REGARDING USITC SECTION 
337 INVESTIGATIONS 1 (2013), available at http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/documents/featured_news/ 
337facts.pdf. 
 320 See David L. Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study of Claim Construction 
Comparing Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts and the International Trade Commission, 50 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1699, 1702 (2009) (“[O]nly recently has [the ITC] become a popular forum 
for adjudication of patent infringement claims.”). 
 321 See U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, supra note 319, at 1. 
 322 Id. 
 323 An Interview with the Honorable Paul J. Luckern, Chief Administrative Law Judge of the US Inter-
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particular type of case and institutional benefits is more obvious on 
specialized courts than on generalist ones. 
All this is not to say that court competition can only occur in specialized 
courts. Forum shopping is not unique to fields of law that have specialized 
courts.324 Furthermore, scholars have surmised that court competition for 
cases could occur in virtually any field of law.325 Clearly the potential 
correlation between specialization and court competition is not the only 
explanation for the rise of competition that has occurred in bankruptcy and 
patent law. Those fields’ broad venue statutes have allowed numerous courts 
to compete for litigants. Charismatic judges that can set a court’s agenda 
have also played key roles in both patent law and bankruptcy’s court 
competition history. But the history of court competition in areas governed 
by specialized courts suggests that creating specialized courts may increase 
the incentives and opportunities for courts to compete for litigation. 
Lawmakers who understand the potential downsides of court 
competition can better structure specialized courts to avoid the problems 
that have arisen in patent and bankruptcy litigation. For example, when 
creating specialized courts, lawmakers should consider the venue provisions 
that accompany the new court’s jurisdiction. In patent law, for instance, 
court competition could have been reduced if litigants simply had fewer 
venue choices.326 Similarly, bankruptcy law’s forum shopping problem 
began when statutory changes to the venue statute enabled courts to 
compete among themselves for business.327 
 
 324 Mississippi courts, for example, have long been a hotbed of class action litigation. See, 
e.g., Adam Liptak, Court Has Dubious Record as a Class-Action Leader: Critics Say Victims Lose, Even 
If They Win, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2002, at A14 (attributing the appeal of Mississippi courts to a 
propensity to approve lawyer-friendly settlements). 
 325 See, e.g., Daniel Klerman, Personal Jurisdiction and Product Liability, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1551, 1554 (2012) (suggesting that states might compete to attract business to the state by 
“weakening their product liability law or otherwise tilting their procedural and choice-of-law rules 
to favor defendants”).   
 326 Recently, Congress seriously considered, but ultimately chose not to amend the patent 
venue statute. See Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 8(a) (proposing limitations 
on available venues for litigants). In previous work, I have argued that the venue provisions were 
removed from the America Invents Act due to interbranch dialogue between Congress and the 
Federal Circuit. See J. Jonas Anderson, Patent Dialogue, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1049, 1070-71 (2014) 
(arguing that the venue provisions were removed due to the actions of the Federal Circuit that 
altered the law that Congress was seeking to reform). See generally Jonas Anderson, Congress as a 
Catalyst of Patent Reform at the Federal Circuit, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 961 (2014) (cataloguing the 
dialogue between Congress and the Federal Circuit during the passage of the AIA). 
 327 See LOPUCKI, supra note 17, at 15 (tracing the development of bankruptcy venue 
provisions “that allowed the bankruptcy court competition to develop”). 
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The second lesson for lawmakers is that appellate courts need to be 
more diligent in supervising trial court practices in areas of specialized 
adjudication. The Federal Circuit, for its part, has begun to take steps in 
this direction, as it has begun to review denials of motions to transfer much 
more rigorously than it had previously done.328 District courts would be 
well-advised to similarly police the case management practices of their 
bankruptcy courts. 
 
C. Reducing Forum Shopping and Court Competition 
To reduce forum shopping in the patent system, policymakers must 
also reduce courts’ ability to compete for litigants. This Section reviews 
current academic and congressional proposals to reduce forum shopping in 
patent law. All of these proposals share a common feature: they seek to 
greatly reduce, if not eliminate, discretion in litigant venue decisions. 
Building on these proposals, this Section analyzes other as-yet unstudied 
means of reducing court competition in patent cases. 
 
1. Scholarly Proposals 
Scholars who view patent forum shopping as problematic have put forth 
a number of proposals designed to reduce the practice. Those proposals 
generally involve one of two solutions: (1) the creation of specialized patent 
trial courts or (2) reduced venue options for litigants.329 
Kimberly Moore has proposed the creation of a specialized trial court 
for patent cases that would be reviewed by another specialized court, the 
Federal Circuit.330 Moore’s proposed creation of a single trial court to 
handle all patent trials would completely eliminate forum shopping because 
“there would be no possible alternative forum.”331 Other scholars have made 
similar proposals.332 
Judicial specialization does not, of course, fend off competition between 
courts. The bankruptcy courts’ long history of court competition 
demonstrates the potential for competition among specialized courts. Most 
 
 328 See supra notes 262-267 and accompanying text.  
 329 See Fromer, supra note 9, at 1466-67 (describing the two ways that critics of forum 
shopping have suggested to “clamp down” on the problem: a specialized trial court or restrictions 
on venue choices). 
 330 Moore, supra note 5, at 932. 
 331 Id.  
 332 See, e.g., Rai, supra note 313, at 877-78 (outlining a proposal for the creation of a 
specialized patent trial court). 
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proposals for a specialized patent trial court, however, envision a single 
court that would handle all cases and would therefore have no other court 
against which to compete.333 While specialized courts of the sort envisioned 
by Judge Moore would eliminate forum shopping (and competition for 
litigants) by eliminating alternate courts, specialized trial courts have 
potential downsides as well, including narrowness of vision and capture.334 
Scholars have also proposed changes to the patent venue statute.335 For 
instance, Jeanne Fromer has proposed “making patent venue proper only in 
the district in which the principal place of business of any of a case’s 
defendants is located, with a safety valve to avoid due process concerns, 
which might occur in a minute number of cases.”336 Restricting venue in 
patent law is likely to decrease forum shopping because it will limit courts’ 
ability to compete for litigants.337 The more restrictive the options, the less 
competition will exist. Restricting venue limits a court’s ability to attract 
litigants and therefore decreases the likelihood that any particular court will 
craft rules or norms specifically designed to attract plaintiffs. Such a change 
would shift courts’ focus back to crafting rules and norms that streamline 
the litigation on the docket—rather than shape the docket in the first 
place—and would be a welcome modification to the patent system. 
Of course, venue restrictions do not automatically eliminate court 
competition for litigants. Indeed, bankruptcy has a more restrictive venue 
statute than patent law,338 yet it has been afflicted with persistent forum 
shopping and court competition.339 Bankruptcy courts in districts that are 
home to large numbers of corporate headquarters (or, in Delaware’s case, 
the state of incorporation) were able to compete for litigation because many 
large bankruptcy actions satisfied the requisite venue and jurisdictional 
requirements. While not every bankruptcy court could compete successfully 
for litigants, the Delaware court could. 
The same holds true for patent law—not all proposals to restrict venue 
would eliminate forum shopping. For example, Judge Moore has proposed 
limiting venue in patent cases “based on [a] defendant’s residence and state 
 
 333 Moore, supra note 5, at 932. 
 334 Rai, supra note 313, at 895-97 (discussing arguments against the creation of a specialized 
patent trial court). 
 335 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 5, at 936-37 (concluding that “modification of the patent 
venue statute” could increase the efficiency of dispute resolution “with minimal upheaval”). 
 336 Fromer, supra note 9, at 1447. 
 337 See id. at 1478-79 (arguing that restricting venue to a litigant’s principal place of business 
will decrease forum shopping and in turn promote more skilled decisionmaking). 
 338 See supra notes 293-94 and accompanying text. 
 339 See supra notes 295-312 and accompanying text. 
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of incorporation.”340 Adopting Judge Moore’s proposal would likely 
decrease the number of cases filed in the Eastern District of Texas due to an 
inability to compete with courts that have more contacts with broader 
swaths of potential defendants. Her proposal would not, however, 
significantly reduce the overall competition for patent litigation. Even 
though a restricted venue statute often limits the number of courts that can 
compete for litigants, it does not eliminate such competition. In fact, as 
LoPucki has shown in the bankruptcy context, competition between courts 
can be quite robust even when only two courts are involved.341 Indeed, any 
venue statute that relies on state of incorporation merely tilts the 
competitive playing field in Delaware’s favor. 
Jeanne Fromer’s proposed venue modification—combined with the new 
joinder rules of the America Invents Act (AIA)—would likely eliminate 
court competition from patent litigation. Because the AIA restricts joinder 
of accused defendants to cases arising out of the “same transaction [or] 
occurrence” of infringement,342 patent plaintiffs usually must bring suit 
against defendants on an individual basis. Thus, since Fromer’s proposal 
limits venue to the defendant’s principal place of business,343 there would 
be only one available venue per patent suit. 
 
2. Congressional Proposals 
Congress has also shown an interest in tinkering with the patent venue 
statute. Early versions of the AIA contained alterations to the venue statute 
that would have limited venue to jurisdictions where (a) defendant had its 
principal place of business or (b) infringement occurred and the defendant 
had an established business.344 Later versions loosened the restrictions on 
venue by permitting venue in the location in which the plaintiff resides as 
long as the plaintiff was an individual inventor or institution of higher 
learning.345 Ultimately, however, Congress passed a version of the AIA 
which contained no changes to the patent venue statute.346 
But Congress has enacted one change to patent case assignments that 
has the potential to significantly impact forum shopping. Arising from 
 
 340 Moore, supra note 5, at 934. 
 341 See LOPUCKI, supra note 17, at 74 (discussing competition between bankruptcy courts in 
New York and Delaware). 
 342 35 U.S.C. § 299(a)(1) (2012). 
 343 Fromer, supra note 9, at 1477. 
 344 Anderson, Congress as a Catalyst, supra note 326, at 986. 
 345 Id. at 993 n.10. 
 346 Id. at 1004. 
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academic arguments for specialized adjudication in patent law, Congress 
began the Patent Pilot Program (PPP) in 2011.347 The PPP allows selected 
district courts to create a subgroup of judges within the district that are 
preselected to handle patent cases filed in the district.348 
While the PPP was designed to increase expertise among judges 
handling patent cases, it may also lead to increased competition among 
those judges for patent cases. Before the creation of the PPP, district courts 
with large numbers of judges (such as the Northern District of California 
and the Northern District of Illinois) were largely unable to compete with 
the smaller district courts (such as the Eastern District of Texas, the 
District of Delaware, and the Western District of Wisconsin) for patent 
cases. In the competition for litigants, districts with fewer judges have 
multiple advantages over larger districts in the market for patent litigation. 
First, smaller districts are more able to develop an expertise in a 
particular area. For instance, the District of Delaware has four active-
service judges.349 Because of the small number of judges on the court and 
the high number of patent cases on the docket, each judge has a large 
number of docketed patent cases at any one time. In 2009 alone, each active 
judge averaged over fifty new patent cases assigned to his or her docket.350 
Contrast the District of Delaware with the Central District of California, 
which received the most patent filings of any district in 2009. The Central 
District has twenty-seven active judges.351 Again assuming that senior 
judges are not assigned any patent cases, the average Central District judge 
received around nine patent cases in 2009. Thus, judges in small districts 
can acquire expertise more quickly than judges in large districts. 
Second, smaller districts can unify district norms. A large district, like 
the Southern District of New York, confronts a collective action problem 
when adopting local rules or informal norms governing cases. The twenty-
eight judges in the district are distinct individuals, some of whom may want 
to see an increase in a certain type of litigation and some of whom may 
prefer precisely the opposite. Smaller districts, on the other hand, have 
fewer potential judges willing to resist the move towards district-wide 
conformity. Indeed, the list of districts that have adopted PLRs is filled 
 
 347 Patent Cases Pilot Program, Pub. L. No. 111-349, 124 Stat. 3674 (2011). 
 348 Id. 
 349 28 U.S.C. § 133(a) (2012). In addition to the four active judges, the District of Delaware 
currently has one senior judge.  
 350 This does not include senior judges who, in most districts, can take patent cases if they so 
desire. Most senior judges do not choose to do so. 
 351 28 U.S.C. § 133(a) (2012). An unfilled vacancy exists on the court as of the time of this 
writing. 
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with districts that are among the top ten districts for annual patent 
filings352 and districts with fewer than eleven judges.353 Of the four largest 
districts in the country—those with over twenty judges—only the Northern 
District of Illinois has adopted PLRs, despite the prevalence of patent 
litigation in many of those large districts.354 
Third, small districts can more easily adopt a unified judicial philosophy 
with an eye towards attracting litigation. For the same reasons outlined 
above, collective action problems make unification of large districts much 
more difficult than smaller ones. For example, rocket dockets tend to arise 
in smaller districts because the judges are more capable of acting as a 
collective to reduce backlog.355 
Fourth, small districts enjoy the benefits of reduced uncertainty in the 
judge assignment process. In the Western District of Wisconsin, which has 
only two active-service judges,356 potential plaintiffs can assume a 50% 
probability of being assigned to a particular judge. The Central District of 
California, on the other hand, presents much greater uncertainty in 
predicting one’s judge. 
Fifth, small districts, like small companies, can be more responsive to 
changes in the market. When new procedural issues arise in patent 
litigation, smaller districts can quickly alter their rules or norms to improve 
the litigation experience in their district. 
Given all of the competitive advantages of small districts, the PPP may 
merely level the competitive playing field for large districts. Now, large 
districts like the Northern District of Illinois can theoretically compete 
with smaller districts because, for patent cases only, they operate much like 
a small district court. While the PPP is likely to increase judicial 
 
 352 This includes the Eastern District of Texas, the Northern District of California, the 
District of Massachusetts, the Northern District of Illinois, the District of New Jersey, the 
Southern District of California, and the District of Minnesota. 
 353 The districts with PLRs and the number of judges in those districts are the Northern 
District of California (14), the Southern District of California (13), the Western District of 
Washington (7), the Northern District of Texas (12), the Eastern District of Texas (7), the 
Southern District of Texas (19), the Western District of Wisconsin (2), the District of Minnesota 
(7), the Northern District of Illinois (22), the Western District of Pennsylvania (10), the Northern 
District of Georgia (11), the Eastern District of Virginia (11), the Eastern District of North 
Carolina (4), the District of New Jersey (17), the District of Massachusetts (13), and the Northern 
District of Ohio (11). 28 U.S.C. § 133(a) (2012). 
 354 Historically, the Central District of California and the Southern District of New York are 
among the top ten filing districts. See Lemley, supra note 2, at 405 tbl.2. 
 355 See Vishnubhakat, supra note 141, at 68-70 (discussing the characteristics of rocket 
dockets). 
 356 28 U.S.C. § 133(a) (2012). 
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specialization in patent cases, it also may allow more districts to enter into 
the competition for litigants. 
 
3. Other Potential Methods of Reducing Court Competition 
There are ways to eliminate court competition beyond the traditional 
academic approaches of venue restrictions and the creation of specialized 
trial courts. One way that has been suggested in the literature on 
bankruptcy forum shopping involves randomization of case assignment. 
This subsection will briefly analyze the costs and benefits of three such 
potential randomization procedures. 
 
a. Randomizing Case Assignment Within Districts 
First, and most painlessly, Congress could mandate that district courts 
randomize assignment of patent cases within their districts. Limiting the 
ability of courts, such as the Eastern District of Virginia and the Eastern 
District of Texas, to deviate from random assignment procedures for patent 
cases would eliminate one of the most effective efforts to attract, or 
dissuade, patent litigants from filing in a court. 
The Eastern District of Texas has continually had case assignment 
procedures for patent cases that allow litigants to select the judge who will 
preside over their case.357 Such an ability to “judge shop” has been 
uniformly decried as antithetical to notions of justice.358 LoPucki notes that 
the ability to “judge shop” was one of the features of Delaware bankruptcy 
courts that initially appealed to bankruptcy filers.359 
Congress could easily eliminate courts’ ability to permit pre-selection of 
judges. Under 28 U.S.C. § 137, chief judges of district courts have the 
power to “assign the cases” in accordance with the rules and orders of the 
court.360 The statute grants chief judges broad discretion in assigning cases. 
Congress could amend the statute to require that district courts assign cases 
in a randomized manner among the judges. This modification would 




 357 See supra subsection II.B.2.b.i. 
 358 See supra note 223. 
 359 See supra note 226. 
 360 28 U.S.C. § 137 (2012). 
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b. National Assignment of Patent Cases 
Alternatively, Congress could create a more radical means of 
randomizing case assignment in patent cases. For instance, Congress could 
adopt nationwide jurisdiction for patent cases and randomly assign patent 
cases to a subset of district judges with expertise in patent law. Under this 
system, patent litigants would file cases with a national body, and then each 
case would be randomly assigned to a judge with expertise in patent law. 
Such a proposal would eliminate forum shopping, but would impose 
significant additional costs on patent litigants that would likely outweigh 
the benefits. 
At first glance, assigning patent cases nationally has a number of 
potential benefits. First, it eliminates the ability of judges and courts to 
compete for litigants. Because patent cases would be assigned randomly on 
the national level, courts would be unable to attract or dissuade litigants 
from filing. Likewise, litigants would be unable to select advantageous 
venues, thus eliminating forum shopping as well. 
Second, because court competition would be eliminated, courts would 
have no incentive to persuade litigants to file in their court by adjusting 
administrative, procedural, and case management practices. Instead, courts 
would be incentivized to structure their case management practices to 
efficiently handle patent cases. 
A third benefit would be increased judicial specialization in patent 
trials. A subset of federal district judges would hear all patent cases, thus 
developing expertise in patent law and patent case management, similar to 
the expertise enjoyed today by some judges in Delaware and the Eastern 
District of Texas. The desire to have experienced patent jurists has driven 
many reform proposals in patent law, from the PPP to the creation of the 
Federal Circuit.361 
Of course, there are drawbacks to any radical alteration of the litigation 
system, and the drawbacks of national assignment of patent cases likely 
outweigh any benefits gained from reduced court competition. First, a 
national assignment system would eliminate litigant choice with respect to 
venue. It is a generally accepted premise of the U.S. adversarial litigation 
system that a plaintiff has the right, at least initially, to bring her case in a 
forum of her choice.362 
 
 361 See supra subsections II.A.1-2. 
 362 See Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994) (“While a defendant 
does have a right, given by statute, to remove in certain situations, plaintiff is still 
the master of his own claim.”). The existence of the plaintiff-choice system does not have a 
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National patent assignment would also raise constitutional questions 
about jurisdiction: for a district court to hear a case, it must possess subject 
matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and proper venue. Patent law has 
its own venue statute that permits patent infringement suits to be brought 
in any district where (1) the defendant resides or (2) “the defendant has 
committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of 
business.”363 Following the 1988 amendment to the general venue statute, 
the Federal Circuit has interpreted a corporation’s residence as any district 
in which personal jurisdiction lies.364 Therefore, in patent cases, venue is 
proper whenever personal jurisdiction exists. 
For a court to exercise personal jurisdiction, the defendant need only 
have “minimum contacts” with the forum.365 If patent cases were randomly 
assigned, these requirements would be easily met in most cases; companies 
that offer products nationally are likely to be subject to the personal 
jurisdiction of a large number of district courts, if not all ninety-four U.S. 
district courts.366 In some cases, however, minimum contacts would not 
exist. 
Antitrust law provides a potential statutory fix to this problem. Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(A) requires that federal courts follow the 
jurisdictional requirements imposed by the states in which those courts 
reside.367 However, an exception to that rule is provided in Rule 4(k)(1)(C), 
which recognizes that Congress has the authority to create nationwide 
jurisdiction for federal question cases.368 Thus, Congress could establish 
nationwide jurisdiction for all patent cases. By doing so, Congress could 
enable nationwide case assignment and eliminate jurisdictional limits on all 
 
strong theoretical pedigree, however. See Debra Lyn Bassett & Rex R. Perschbacher, The Roots of 
Removal, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 2 n.4 (2011) (noting that while the scholarly commentary on the 
issue is lacking, it is “the baseline norm that . . . plaintiffs have the initial choice of judicial 
system . . . and the place of trial (venue)”). 
 363 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012). 
 364 VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see 
also Moore, supra note 5, at 896-97 (describing the conflation of the patent venue statute and the 
general venue statute in patent cases); Thomas A. O’Rourke, The Modernization of the Patent Venue 
Statute, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 585, 600 (1992) (concluding that the standards for personal 
jurisdiction and venue are identical in patent cases). 
 365 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985). 
 366 Moore, supra note 5, at 897. 
 367 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A). 
 368 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(C) (permitting personal jurisdiction “when authorized by a 
federal statute”). 
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patent cases. Congress has done this with antitrust cases, permitting 
nationwide jurisdiction for Sherman Act cases.369 
Ultimately, nationalizing the patent assignment system is undesirable 
because it throws the baby out with the bathwater.370 If all cases were 
randomly assigned nationally, patent plaintiffs would quite often be forced 
to litigate away from “home.” For those patent plaintiffs that are small 
entities, being assigned to a far-away district court could represent a 
significant financial burden.371 Indeed, while the districts of Delaware and 
Eastern Texas oversee a large portion of patent litigation in the United 
States, a significant portion of the patent litigation in other districts 
involves small entities. Colleen Chien has found that around 18% of patent 
plaintiffs are small companies, nonprofits, or individuals.372 Such plaintiffs 
would be significantly burdened if forced to litigate in a random district. 
Thus, a dramatic change to patent litigation, like a national assignment 
system, would potentially impose additional costs on those least able to 
bear them and would be politically unfeasible. 
 
c. Judicial Assignment of Venue 
As a third option, patent cases could be assigned to the most convenient 
district as determined by a judicial panel. A similar process occurs with 
Multi-District Litigation (MDL). In civil actions “involving one or more 
common questions of fact . . . pending in different districts,” the Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation—a special entity within the U.S. federal 
court system—determines whether multiple actions should be consolidated 
in a single court for pretrial proceedings.373 The Judicial Panel is comprised 
of seven judges from different circuits who are appointed by the Chief 
Justice of the United States.374 In theory, patent cases could be submitted to 
 
 369 15 U.S.C. § 5 (2012). 
 370 See, e.g., Daniel Klerman, Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction, J. LEGAL ANALYSIS (forthcoming) 
(manuscript at 47-51) (evaluating potential randomization proposals and ultimately concluding 
that they “are not likely to be implemented” because they offend traditional notions of due 
process and sovereignty). 
 371 See id. at 48 (discussing the costs associated with random assignment of cases, including 
increased regional attorney fees and increased travel costs).  
 372 Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the 
Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1600 tbl.3 (2009). 
 373 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012). 
 374 Id. § 1407(d); see also Overview of Panel, U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., 
http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/panel-info/overview-panel (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/X9DH-GXZ9. 
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a similarly constructed panel, which would then select the venue with the 
greatest ties to the case. 
While such a procedure would likely result in a more equitable and 
rational assignment of patent cases in most instances, it would impose an 
additional layer of complexity and cost to the patent system. Indeed, a 
judicial panel for patent case assignment would be much more burdensome 
than that for MDL. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation issued 
432 orders in 2013, its highest number on record.375 In contrast, nearly the 
same number of patent cases was filed in district courts in the month of 
December 2013 alone.376 Any patent assignment panel would have to resolve 
venue for over ten times the number of cases decided by the Judicial Panel 
on MDL—a costly judicial undertaking. Thus, while such an assignment 
panel could improve the patent system, the increased administrative costs 
would have to be carefully considered. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Forum shopping in patent law is fueled in part by competition among 
courts to attract litigants. Courts engage in court competition for a host of 
reasons, including prestige, increased budget outlays, or personal interest in 
particular types of cases. Courts can compete for litigants by establishing 
predictable practices—some administrative, some procedural—that appeal 
to particular plaintiffs. 
Court competition in patent law parallels the court competition that has 
occurred in bankruptcy law. In both areas, courts have attracted litigants by 
permitting “judge shopping,” creating unique procedural rules that were 
seen as pro-plaintiff, and adopting predictable case management norms that 
appealed to plaintiffs. In patent law, unlike bankruptcy, some courts have 
sought to dissuade litigants from filing in their courtrooms. In patent law, 
as in bankruptcy law, the competition for litigants has at times led to an 
unfair disadvantage to defendants. 
Previous scholarly proposals to limit venue or create a specialized patent 
court have the potential to reduce or eliminate court competition, but also 
carry a number of drawbacks. Randomizing judge assignment also has the 
potential to reduce patent forum shopping but has yet to be considered by 
 
 375 U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., CALENDAR YEAR STATISTICS OF 
THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION (2013), available at 
http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/JPML_Calendar_Year_Statistics-2013.pdf. 
 376 428 cases were filed in December 2013. Lex Machina Releases First Annual Patent Litigation 
Year in Review, LEX MACHINA (May 13, 2014), https://lexmachina.com/ 
2014/05/patent-litigation-review, archived at http://perma.cc/L2J2-E6TP. 
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academics studying the patent system. Ultimately, Congress should require 
district courts to assign cases randomly among the district’s judges, perhaps 
in conjunction with tightened venue requirements for patent cases. While 
most districts already employ randomized patent case assignment, some 
districts have used nonrandom assignment to either attract or repel patent 
filers. Requiring random assignment would not wholly eliminate court 
competition in patent cases, but it would remove one of the primary means 
by which courts seek to attract litigants to their courtrooms. 
 
